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executive summary
This guideline provides the updated recommendations of the
Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) re-
garding the management of healthcare providers who are
infected with hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus
(HCV), and/or the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
For the reasons cited in the guideline, SHEA continues to
recommend that, although some aspects of the approach to
and administrative management of each of these infectious
syndromes in healthcare providers are similar, separate man-
agement strategies for healthcare workers who are infected
with these unrelated viruses remain appropriate. As we did
in both prior iterations of this document, SHEA emphasizes
the use of appropriate infection control procedures to min-
imize exposure of patients or providers to blood, emphasizes
that transfers of blood from patients to providers and from
providers to patients should be avoided, and recommends
that infected healthcare providers should not be totally pro-
hibited from participating in patient-care activities solely on
the basis of a bloodborne pathogen infection. The types of
procedures assessed by the panel as associated with an in-
creased risk for provider-to-patient transmission of these
pathogens are discussed in detail. For each pathogen, rec-
ommendations are graduated according to the relative viral
load level of the infected provider (Tables 1 and 2). However,
SHEA emphasizes that, because of the complexity of these
cases, each such case will be slightly different from the next,
and each should be independently considered in context.
HBV
SHEA recommends that HBV-infected healthcare providers
who test either positive for HBV “e” antigen (HBeAg) or
negative for HBeAg but who have circulating HBV burdens
of greater than or equal to 104 genome equivalents (GE) per
milliliter of blood routinely use double-gloving for all invasive
procedures, for all contact with mucous membranes or non-
intact skin, and for all instances in patient care for which
gloving is recommended, and that they not perform those
Category III activities identified as associated with a risk for
provider-to-patient HBV transmission despite the use of ap-
propriate infection control procedures (details of the pro-
cedures identified as associated with increased risk for trans-
mission are given in Table 2).
SHEA recommends that a healthcare provider who has a
circulating HBV burden of less than 104 GE/mL be allowed
to perform those Category III activities identified as associated
with a risk for provider-to-patient transmission of blood-
borne pathogens, so long as the infected provider (1) is not
detected as having transmitted infection to patients; (2) ob-
tains advice from an Expert Review Panel (the function of
the Expert Review Panel is discussed in more detail in Rec-
ommendation 8, below) about continued practice; (3) un-
dergoes follow-up routinely by Occupational Medicine staff
(or an appropriate public health official), who test the pro-
vider twice per year to demonstrate the maintenance of a
viral burden of less than 104 GE/mL; (4) also receives follow-
up by a personal physician who has expertise in the man-
agement of HBV infection and who is allowed by the provider
to communicate with the Expert Review Panel about the
provider’s clinical status; (5) consults with an expert about
optimal infection control procedures (and strictly adheres to
the recommended procedures, including the routine use of
double gloving for Category II and Category III procedures
and frequent glove changes during procedures, particularly
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table 1. Summary Recommendations for Managing Healthcare Providers Infected with Hep-
atitis B Virus (HBV), Hepatitis C Virus (HCV), and/or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)
Virus,
circulating viral burden Categories of clinical activitiesa Recommendation Testing
HBV
!104 GE/mL Categories I, II, and III No restrictionsb Twice per year
x104 GE/mL Categories I and II No restrictionsb NA
x104 GE/mL Category III Restrictedc NA
HCV
!104 GE/mL Categories I, II, and III No restrictionsb Twice per year
x104 GE/mL Categories I and II No restrictionsb NA
x104 GE/mL Category III Restrictedc NA
HIV
!5#102 GE/mL Categories I, II, and III No restrictionsb Twice per year
x5#102 GE/mL Categories I and II No restrictionsb NA
x5#102 GE/mL Category III Restrictedd NA
note. These recommendations provide a framework within which to consider such cases; however, each
such case is sufficiently complex that each should be independently considered in context by the expert review
panel (see text). GE, genome equivalents; NA, not applicable.
a See Table 2 for the categorization of clinical activities.
b No restrictions recommended, so long as the infected healthcare provider (1) is not detected as having
transmitted infection to patients; (2) obtains advice from an Expert Review Panel about continued practice;
(3) undergoes follow-up routinely by Occupational Medicine staff (or an appropriate public health official),
who test the provider twice per year to demonstrate the maintenance of a viral burden of less than the
recommended threshold (see text); (4) also receives follow-up by a personal physician who has expertise in
the management of her or his infection and who is allowed by the provider to communicate with the Expert
Review Panel about the provider’s clinical status; (5) consults with an expert about optimal infection control
procedures (and strictly adheres to the recommended procedures, including the routine use of double-gloving
for Category II and Category III procedures and frequent glove changes during procedures, particularly if
performing technical tasks known to compromise glove integrity [eg, placing sternal wires]), and (6) agrees
to the information in and signs a contract or letter from the Expert Review Panel that characterizes her or
his responsibilities (see text).
c These procedures permissible only when viral burden is !104 GE/mL.
d These procedures permissible only when viral burden is ! GE/mL.25 # 10
if performing technical tasks known to compromise glove
integrity [eg, placing sternal wires]); (6) agrees to the infor-
mation in and signs a contract or letter from the Expert
Review Panel that characterizes her or his responsibilities
(discussed in more detail in Recommendation 8, below).
HCV
SHEA recommends that HCV-infected providers who have
circulating HCV viral burdens of greater than or equal to 104
GE/mL routinely use double-gloving for all invasive proce-
dures, for all contact with mucous membranes or nonintact
skin, and for all instances in patient care for which gloving
is routinely recommended, and that they not perform those
Category III activities identified as associated with a risk for
provider-to-patient transmission of bloodborne pathogen in-
fection despite the use of appropriate infection control pro-
cedures. SHEA also recommends that an HCV-infected pro-
vider who has a viral burden of less than 104 GE/mL not be
excluded from any aspect of patient care, including the per-
formance of Category III procedures (Tables 1 and 2), so long
as the infected provider (1) is not detected as having trans-
mitted infection to patients; (2) obtains advice from an Expert
Review Panel about continued practice; (3) undergoes follow-
up routinely by Occupational Medicine, who tests the pro-
vider twice annually to demonstrate the maintenance of a
viral burden of less than 104 GE/mL; (4) also receives follow-
up by a personal physician who has expertise in the man-
agement of HCV infection and who is allowed by the provider
to communicate with the Expert Review Panel about the
provider’s clinical status; (5) consults with an infection con-
trol expert about optimal infection control procedures (and
strictly adheres to the recommended procedures, including
the routine use of double-gloving during Category II and
Category III procedures and frequent glove changes during
procedures, particularly if performing technical tasks known
to compromise glove integrity [eg, placing sternal wires]); 6)
agrees to the information in and signs a contract or letter
from the Expert Review Panel that characterizes her or his
responsibilities (discussed in more detail in Recommendation
8, below).
HIV
SHEA recommends that HIV-infected providers who have
circulating HIV viral burdens of greater than or equal to
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GE/mL routinely use double-gloving for all invasive25 # 10
procedures, for all contact with mucous membranes or non-
intact skin, and for all instances in patient care for which
gloving is recommended, and that they not perform those
Category III activities identified as associated with a risk for
provider-to-patient transmission of bloodborne pathogen in-
fection despite the use of appropriate infection control pro-
cedures (Tables 1 and 2). SHEA recommends that an HIV-
infected provider who has a viral burden of less than 5 #
GE/mL not be excluded from any aspect of patient care,210
including the performance of Category III procedures, so long
as the infected provider (1) is not detected as having trans-
mitted infection to patients; (2) obtains advice from an Expert
Review Panel about continued practice; (3) undergoes follow-
up routinely by Occupational Medicine (or an appropriate
public health official), who tests the provider twice annually
to demonstrate the maintenance of a viral burden of less than
GE/mL; (4) also receives follow-up by a personal25 # 10
physician who has expertise in the management of HIV in-
fection and who is allowed by the provider to communicate
with the Expert Review Panel about the provider’s clinical
status; (5) consults with an expert about optimal infection
control procedures (and strictly adheres to the recommended
procedures, including the routine use of double-gloving for
Category II and Category III procedures and frequent glove
changes during procedures, particularly if performing tech-
nical tasks known to compromise glove integrity [eg, placing
sternal wires]); and (6) agrees to the information in and signs
a contract or letter from the Expert Review Panel that char-
acterizes her or his responsibilities (discussed in more detail
in Recommendation 8, below).
General Recommendations
The rationale for these recommendations is presented below
(in the section Background and Rationale). SHEA argues for
comprehensive education concerning bloodborne pathogens
for all healthcare providers and trainees. SHEA recommends
managing infected providers in the context of a comprehen-
sive approach to the management of all impaired providers.
SHEA emphasizes the importance of patient safety as well as
provider privacy and medical confidentiality. The Society also
emphasizes the importance of offering employees who have
disabilities reasonable accommodation for their disabilities.
The guideline discusses exposure management in detail and,
in general, recommends adherence to existing guidelines for
managing exposures to these viruses. SHEA underscores that
practitioners who are institutionally based and who develop
one of these bloodborne pathogen infections are ethically
bound to report their infections to their institutions’ occu-
pational medicine providers and to engage in the processes
outlined below. Further, practitioners who are not institu-
tionally based and who develop one of these bloodborne path-
ogen infections are ethically bound to engage their public
health departments (consonant with state and local laws), as
described below. Finally, the society encourages routine vol-
untary, confidential testing of providers, emphasizing that
providers who conduct Category III procedures should know
their immune or infection status with respect to each of these
3 bloodborne pathogens. Specific details and the rationale for
these recommendations are included in the body of the
guideline.
introduction
In 1990, in response to public and professional concern that
arose in the wake of a highly publicized cluster of cases of
provider-to-patient transmission of the human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV) in a Florida dentist’s practice,3-8, SHEA,
in collaboration with the Association for Practitioners in In-
fection Control, published a position paper concerning the
administrative management of healthcare providers who are
infected with certain bloodborne pathogens.9 As additional
information became available, in 1997 SHEA issued an up-
dated position paper discussing the management of health-
care workers infected with hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis
C virus (HCV), HIV, or other bloodborne pathogens.10 The
purpose of the present guideline is to provide updated guid-
ance from SHEA regarding the administrative management
of providers infected with these bloodborne pathogens, given
the progress in the field since 1997.
Despite the widespread use of the hepatitis B vaccine, HBV
remains the most commonly transmitted bloodborne path-
ogen in the healthcare setting. Although continued wide-
spread administration of the vaccine should eventually mit-
igate this risk, any guideline for the years 2009 and beyond
must include recommendations for HBV-infected providers.
Similarly, the past 12 years’ experience has provided insight
in the factors influencing the risk for provider-to-patient
transmission of HCV. Because we do not have a hepatitis C
vaccine yet, and, with the prevalence of HCV infection rising
around the world, this flavivirus is likely to become the most
frequently transmitted bloodborne pathogen in health care
in the years ahead. Provider-to-patient transmission of HIV
has been extremely rare, with no cases reported worldwide
since 2003. Nonetheless, the first instance of transmission of
HIV from an infected provider to a patient was the driving
force for the creation of guidelines and recommendations
about providers infected with bloodborne pathogens.
This document provides updated information about each
virus and the healthcare risks associated with infected prac-
titioners and then addresses a series of questions relevant to
the management of providers infected with each of these
viruses. We then make recommendations about the manage-
ment of providers infected with these bloodborne pathogens,
citing the available evidence supporting the recommenda-
tions. The evidence base for these recommendations is limit-
ed at best. By the very nature of the topics being discussed, di-
rect hypothesis-driven experimentation is virtually impossi-
ble, and may be complicated further by a low rate of voluntary
table 2. Categorization of Healthcare-Associated Procedures According to Level of Risk for Bloodborne Pathogen
Transmission
Category I: Procedures with de minimis risk of bloodborne virus transmission
• Regular history-taking and/or physical or dental examinations, including gloved oral examination with a mirror
and/or tongue depressor and/or dental explorer and periodontal probe
• Routine dental preventive procedures (eg, application of sealants or topical fluoride or administration of
prophylaxisa), diagnostic procedures, orthodontic procedures, prosthetic procedures (eg, denture fabrication),
cosmetic procedures (eg, bleaching) not requiring local anesthesia
• Routine rectal or vaginal examination
• Minor surface suturing
• Elective peripheral phlebotomyb
• Lower gastrointestinal tract endoscopic examinations and procedures, such as sigmoidoscopy and colonoscopy
• Hands-off supervision during surgical procedures and computer-aided remote or robotic surgical procedures
• Psychiatric evaluationsc
Category II: Procedures for which bloodborne virus transmission is theoretically possible but unlikely
• Locally anesthetized ophthalmologic surgery
• Locally anesthetized operative, prosthetic, and endodontic dental procedures
• Periodontal scaling and root planingd
• Minor oral surgical procedures (eg, simple tooth extraction [ie, not requiring excess force], soft tissue flap or
sectioning, minor soft tissue biopsy, or incision and drainage of an accessible abscess)
• Minor local procedures (eg, skin excision, abscess drainage, biopsy, and use of laser) under local anesthesia
(often under bloodless conditions)
• Percutaneous cardiac procedures (eg, angiography and catheterization)
• Percutaneous and other minor orthopedic procedures
• Subcutaneous pacemaker implantation
• Bronchoscopy
• Insertion and maintenance of epidural and spinal anesthesia lines
• Minor gynecological procedures (eg, dilatation and curettage, suction abortion, colposcopy, insertion and
removal of contraceptive devices and implants, and collection of ova)
• Male urological procedures (excluding transabdominal intrapelvic procedures)
• Upper gastrointestinal tract endoscopic procedures
• Minor vascular procedures (eg, embolectomy and vein stripping)
• Amputations, including major limbs (eg, hemipelvectomy and amputation of legs or arms) and minor
amputations (eg, amputations of fingers, toes, hands, or feet)
• Breast augmentation or reduction
• Minimum-exposure plastic surgical procedures (eg, liposuction, minor skin resection for reshaping, face lift,
brow lift, blepharoplasty, and otoplasty)
• Total and subtotal thyroidectomy and/or biopsy
• Endoscopic ear, nose, and throat surgery and simple ear and nasal procedures (eg, stapedectomy or stapedoto-
my, and insertion of tympanostomy tubes)
• Ophthalmic surgery
• Assistance with an uncomplicated vaginal deliverye
• Laparoscopic procedures
• Thoracoscopic proceduresf
• Nasal endoscopic proceduresg
• Routine arthroscopic proceduresh
• Plastic surgeryi
• Insertion of, maintenance of, and drug administration into arterial and central venous lines
• Endotracheal intubation and use of laryngeal mask
• Obtainment and use of venous and arterial access devices that occur under complete antiseptic technique, using
universal precautions, “no-sharp” technique, and newly gloved hands
Category III: Procedures for which there is definite risk of bloodborne virus transmission or
that have been classified previously as “exposure-prone”
• General surgery, including nephrectomy, small bowel resection, cholecystectomy, subtotal thyroidectomy other
elective open abdominal surgery
• General oral surgery, including surgical extractions,j hard and soft tissue biopsy (if more extensive and/or
having difficult access for suturing), apicoectomy, root amputation, gingivectomy, periodontal curettage,
mucogingival and osseous surgery, alveoplasty or alveoectomy, and endosseous implant surgery
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table 2. (Continued)
• Cardiothoracic surgery, including valve replacement, coronary artery bypass grafting, other bypass surgery, heart
transplantation, repair of congenital heart defects, thymectomy, and open-lung biopsy
• Open extensive head and neck surgery involving bones, including oncological procedures
• Neurosurgery, including craniotomy, other intracranial procedures, and open-spine surgery
• Nonelective procedures performed in the emergency department, including open resuscitation efforts, deep
suturing to arrest hemorrhage, and internal cardiac massage
• Obstetrical/gynecological surgery, including cesarean delivery, hysterectomy, forceps delivery, episiotomy, cone
biopsy, and ovarian cyst removal, and other transvaginal obstetrical and gynecological procedures involving
hand-guided sharps
• Orthopedic procedures, including total knee arthroplasty, total hip arthroplasty, major joint replacement
surgery, open spine surgery, and open pelvic surgery
• Extensive plastic surgery, including extensive cosmetic procedures (eg, abdominoplasty and thoracoplasty)
• Transplantation surgery (except skin and corneal transplantation)
• Trauma surgery, including open head injuries, facial and jaw fracture reductions, extensive soft-tissue trauma,
and ophthalmic trauma
• Interactions with patients in situations during which the risk of the patient biting the physician is significant;
for example, interactions with violent patients or patients experiencing an epileptic seizure
• Any open surgical procedure with a duration of more than 3 hours, probably necessitating glove change
note. Modified from Reitsma et al.1
a Does not include subgingival scaling with hand instrumentation.
b If done emergently (eg, during acute trauma or resuscitation efforts), peripheral phlebotomy is classified as Category III.
c If there is no risk present of biting or of otherwise violent patients.
d Use of an ultrasonic device for scaling and root planing would greatly reduce or eliminate the risk for percutaneous injury to the
provider. If significant physical force with hand instrumentation is anticipated to be necessary, scaling and root planing and other
Class II procedures could be reasonably classified as Category III.
e Making and suturing an episiotomy is classified as Category III.
f If unexpected circumstances require moving to an open procedure (eg, laparotomy or thoracotomy), some of these procedures will
be classified as Category III.
g If moving to an open procedure is required, these procedures will be classified as Category III.
h If opening a joint is indicated and/or use of power instruments (eg, drills) is necessary, this procedure is classified as Category III.
i A procedure involving bones, major vasculature, and/or deep body cavities will be classified as Category III.
j Removal of an erupted or nonerupted tooth requiring elevation of a mucoperiosteal flap, removal of bone, or sectioning of tooth
and suturing if needed.2
reporting of both infection status and high-risk provider-to-
patient transmission events. Most data that we have about
this subject come from documented instances of transmis-
sion. Many if not most of the conclusions from these studies
are inferential. Some evidence comes from experimental lab-
oratory studies or models. Thus, this guideline cannot have
the scientific evidence-base found in many other guidelines.
Nonetheless, we do have a broad experience working with
these pathogens in the healthcare setting and the science base
is much more robust than it was at the time the last guidance
was published by SHEA in 1997.
epidemiology
Provider-to-Patient Transmission of HBV
With respect to HBV transmission, through 1994, investi-
gators at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) had identified 42 instances of provider-to-patient
transmission of HBV (375 patients).11 Subsequently, 2 ad-
ditional clusters of provider-to-patient transmission of HBV
infection were reported that involved surgeons who tested
positive for HBeAg.12,13
In one of these more recent clusters, 4 patients acquired
clinical hepatitis B infection from an orthopedic surgeon fol-
lowing surgeries conducted by the infected provider.13 In a
second, more recent cluster, 19 of the 144 susceptible patients
whose surgical team included an HBV-infected thoracic sur-
gery resident became infected.12 No specific events or breaks
in technique were identified in either cluster that could ex-
plain the transmissions, although the thoracic surgery resi-
dent did not wear double gloves. Since 1996, there have been
an additional 10 reports of hepatitis B transmission from
providers to patients. These cases have generally been asso-
ciated with HBV-infected surgeons; one case was associated
with an infected dentist14,15 (I. Williams, CDC, personal com-
munication). An important report from the United Kingdom
underscored the potential for transmission from providers
who are infected with so-called “pre-core” mutants of HBV.14
Such providers are HBeAg negative but have a high circulating
viral burden. This report14 underscores the importance of
directly measuring viral burden, as opposed to assaying for
surrogate markers of viral burden (such as HBeAg). Only one
relatively recent report is from North America: in this large
outbreak, 75 patients were infected from procedures involving
placement of subdermal electroencephalogram electrodes by
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270a 1 0.37 (0.00–1.44)
1999 Gynecology Gynecological
procedure
3,628b 7 0.19 (0.08–0.36)
2000 General surgery Bowel surgery 627c 2 0.32 (0.03–0.91)
2000 General surgery Bowel surgery 1,145d 4 0.35 (0.09–0.77)

















Overall … … 5,868 15 0.26 (0.13–0.38)
note. Data provided by Fortune Ncube, MD, Health Protection Agency Centre for Infections, United Kingdom
(personal communication). CI, confidence interval.
a More than 97% of the procedures (ie, procedures in 270 of 278 patients) that the provider had participated in
were classified by the incident team as “high-risk exposure-prone procedures.”
b Patient notification was performed in 2 stages: the identification of 4 transmissions triggered an extension of the
look-back exercise, resulting in the identification of 3 additional infections.
c All the patients included in the analysis had procedures that met investigators’ definition of “high risk exposure-
prone procedures,” and 84% (627 of 750) of the infected provider’s exposure-prone procedures were characterized
as “high risk exposure-prone procedures.”
d All these patients had undergone exposure-prone procedures. Investigators assumed that this general surgeon’s
workload was similar to that of the other general surgeon (ie, 84% of exposure prone procedures were “high-risk
exposure prone procedures”).
e All the patients tested and included in the table (ie, accounting for 198 of 228 of the provider’s procedures) were
patients who had high “high risk exposure-prone procedures.”
an HBeAg-positive technician.16 Although infection control
procedures in this electroencephalography clinic were deemed
inadequate, no specific mechanism for transmission was
identified.
Although such clusters continue to occur (acknowledging
that the United States does not have systemic surveillance
measures to detect such cases), they appear to be occurring
less frequently than in the past. In contrast, the problem of
patient-to-patient transmission of HBV and HCV arising
from inadequate infection control precautions, such as reuse
of multidose vials of medication, has become increasingly
important as a cause of iatrogenic bloodborne pathogen
infection.17
Provider-to-Patient Transmission of HCV
Provider-to-patient transmission of HCV has been extremely
uncommon in the United States and has had a reasonably
unique epidemiology in this county. Conversely, transmission
of HCV from infected providers has been somewhat more
frequently detected in Europe (Table 3). As noted above, for
all of these pathogens, provider-to-patient transmission of
HCV is extremely unlikely in the course of routine (ie, non-
invasive) patient care. The risk for provider-to-patient trans-
mission of HCV appears to be even smaller than the risk for
HBV transmission in the course of noninvasive patient care,
presumably because most individuals chronically infected
with HCV have circulating viral loads that are orders of mag-
nitude lower than those of the hepatitis B carriers who have
been identified as transmitting infection to their patients.
Several instances of provider-to-patient transmission of
HCV have been reported in the literature.18-32 The first doc-
umented instance of provider-to-patient transmission of
HCV was reported from England in 1995 (Table 3).23 A pa-
tient who had undergone cardiac surgery developed acute
HCV infection and had no risk factors for infection. The first
assistant surgeon on the operative team was found to be
infected with HCV. A “look-back” study of the patients for
whom the surgeon had provided care revealed that only one
of the surgeon’s 278 patients developed HCV infection with
a strain identical to the surgeon’s.21 During the time the UK
investigation was in process, an additional instance of pro-
vider-to-patient transmission of HCV was reported from
Spain.22 The detection of 2 unexpected cases of HCV infection
among cardiac surgery patients participating in a study of
transfusion-transmitted infections prompted a look-back
study of the patients of a chronically HCV-infected surgeon.
The Spanish look-back study identified an additional 4 HCV
infections (ie, totaling 6 [2.7%] of the 222 patients who had
been operated on by the surgeon).22 Five of the 6 HCV strains
isolated from these patients were closely related to the strain
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isolated from the surgeon, and each of these patients had
undergone valve replacement surgery.22
An HCV-infected gynecologist in the UK transmitted in-
fection to several patients. After a single patient became in-
fected after a gynecological procedure,24,33 a detailed look-
back study tested more than 4,500 patients, of whom 3,628
had undergone “high risk, exposure-prone procedures” that
were performed by the surgeon in the previous 20 years. Seven
additional patients were found to have HCV infection caused
by strains of HCV closely related to the strain recovered from
the surgeon (Table 3).26
Ross and coworkers28 from Germany reported the results
of a look-back study of 207 of the 229 patients operated on
by an HCV-infected orthopedic surgeon. Three of the 207
were found to be HCV infected, but only 1 (a patient who
had undergone a total hip arthroplasty with trochanteric os-
teotomy) was infected with a strain that was similar to the
strain recovered from the HCV-infected orthopedist.28 Sub-
sequently, these same investigators also conducted a look-
back study of the patients of an HCV-infected obstetrician/
gynecologist. The look-back study was prompted by the de-
tection of an unanticipated instance of HCV infection in a
patient who had undergone a cesarean delivery. This patient
was found to be infected with an HCV strain that was virtually
identical to the strain infecting the obstetrician/gynecologist
who had performed the procedure.29 The investigators
screened 2,286 of the obstetrician/gynecologist’s 2,907 pa-
tients and found no further evidence of transmission.29
Three additional patient-to-provider look-back studies in-
volving the potential for transmission of HCV from health-
care worker to patient have been reported from the United
Kingdom (Table 3).27,34,35 In the first of these studies, 3 in-
fections (among 1,900 patients) were attributed to an HCV-
infected provider. In the second, 1 infection was found among
749 patients of an HCV-infected provider.35 In the third, a
look-back study has been reported as being initiated in the
United Kingdom, although no results from the study have
been published;27 letters were sent to 228 patients of an HCV-
infected practitioner offering follow-up testing, after an index
case was identified as linked to the practitioner following an
“exposure-prone” procedure.
Several reports involve HCV-infected anesthesiologists. In
the United Kingdom,31 an HCV-infected anesthesiologist in-
fected a patient during a procedure in which the anesthesi-
ologist endotracheally intubated the patient, inserted a pe-
ripheral venous catheter, and provided general anesthesia. He
did not participate in any procedure considered to be “ex-
posure-prone.” The anesthesiologist vehemently denied in-
jection drug use31; however, in several similar cases described
below, drug diversion was implicated as the cause of blood-
borne pathogen transmission.
Ross and colleagues36 reported a cluster of 5 cases of HCV
infection from an anesthesia assistant. The anesthesia assistant
purportedly acquired acute HCV infection as a result of an
occupational exposure to an HCV-infected patient in the op-
erating room (presumably, by contaminating an open wound
on a finger of his right hand). This assistant may have pre-
sented an increased risk for transmission, since he was work-
ing while developing acute HCV infection and before having
a detectable immunologic response at a time when his viral
burden was likely high. In the course of 3 weeks (during
which his finger was purportedly still weeping) he infected 5
patients. He vehemently denied drug abuse, but the similarity
of this case to the case described by Sehulster and colleagues37
(discussed below) is striking. An important feature of this
cluster is the fact that the anesthesia assistant did not follow
universal/standard precautions. He did not wear gloves (even
when he had the open lesion on his right hand). Ross and
colleagues36 suggest that if the anesthesia assistant had fol-
lowed universal/standard precautions, these infections would
have likely been prevented.
In another highly unusual case, a child acquired HCV in-
fection from his mother, who was functioning as his health-
care provider.38 The child was a hemophiliac whose mother
administered his frequently required clotting-factor concen-
trate infusions. The mother (who had chronic HCV infection)
did not wear gloves and recalled several instances in which
she stuck her own finger with the needle (often with her own
blood visible). Sequence analysis demonstrated that the HCV
isolates from the mother and the child were identical.38
For reasons that are not certain, look-back studies from
the United Kingdom have found substantially more cases of
transmission. Grouping the various studies from the United
Kingdom yields a transmission rate of 0.19% (15 patients
infected of 7,656 patients tested) without inclusion of index
cases, and 0.26% with the inclusion of index cases. In contrast,
studies from Germany have found no additional cases of
transmission among more than 3,000 people tested, beyond
the index cases that prompted the look-back studies. How-
ever, if one includes the index cases, the transmission rate
for these studies is 0.13% (similar to the rate for the studies
from the United Kingdom).
The experience in the United States is quite different. In-
jection drug use on the part of the infected provider appears
to play a more central role in provider-to-patient HCV trans-
mission. Williams and colleagues39 recently reviewed the US
experience, noting that 4 episodes of transmission have been
detected. The first involved an HCV-infected surgical tech-
nician who infected approximately 40 of 346 patients during
a 3-month period.37,39 This healthcare provider admitted self-
injecting anesthesia medications and then using the same
syringe to administer drugs to patients. The second involved
an anesthesiologist who acquired HCV infection from one
patient and subsequently, during the anesthesiologist’s acute
phase of infection, transmitted the same strain of HCV to a
patient; no further transmissions were identified. This an-
esthesiologist was also suspected to be abusing narcotics.20,39
The third case of HCV transmission is more similar to those
seen in the United Kingdom. An HCV-infected cardiac sur-
geon was found to have infected as many as 14 of the 937
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patients who could be evaluated from over a decade of sur-
gical practice.39 Narcotics abuse was not suspected. Interest-
ingly, following an expert review of the surgeon’s practice,
the surgeon was treated for his HCV infection and was al-
lowed to continue to practice; he continued to perform car-
diovascular procedures that would by any measure be con-
sidered exposure-prone. He made modifications to his tech-
nique, including the use of double gloves and other safety
devices, and in addition, his patients were prospectively tested
for HCV infection; to date no additional instances of trans-
mission have been detected. The fourth report describes a
certified registered nurse anesthetist who transmitted HCV
to at least 15 of 164 patients during a 4-month period co-
inciding with the acute phase of his own HCV infection. The
certified registered nurse anesthetist did not perform expo-
sure-prone procedures and a specific mechanism of trans-
mission was not identified; however, similar to the first 2
cases, the nurse anesthetist was suspected of abusing patient
medications.39 A fifth instance of provider-to-patient trans-
mission of HCV in the United States is currently under in-
vestigation, but the details are not yet available (J. Perz, CDC,
personal communication).
Although the precise mode of transmission for HCV for
the majority of these cases remains unknown, the circum-
stances surrounding several of the cases suggest that trans-
mission was associated with percutaneous exposures. Clearly,
at least in the United States, a number of the instances of
provider-to-patient HCV transmission have been associated
with diversion of patients’ drugs to healthcare providers who
were abusing injectable narcotics. Although the contribution
of injection drug use to provider-to-patient transmission of
HCV has been most noticeable in the United States, 2 ad-
ditional cases, one from Spain, the other from Israel, under-
score its potential importance. In the cluster of cases from
Spain, an anesthesiologist who was addicted to opiates was
diverting some of patients’ narcotics for personal use and
then injecting the patients with the same syringe that he had
used, thereby infecting more than 200 patients.18,40 In the
report from Israel, an injection drug–using anesthesiologist
infected 33 patients by diverting some patients’ drugs to him-
self and then using the same apparatus for injecting the drugs
into the patient.32 Detection of underlying injection drug use
in these circumstances is difficult, at best, so one cannot say
for certain the extent to which this behavior may have in-
fluenced the other cases reported in the literature.
Summarizing the world literature and excluding those re-
ports in which injection drug use was considered to be a
contributing factor for transmission, there were 2 gynecol-
ogists, 3 cardiac or thoracic surgeons, 1 anesthesiologist, and
1 orthopedic surgeon involved in the instances of transmis-
sion. These data lend credence to the hypothesis that “ex-
posure-prone, invasive procedures” are likely to pose the larg-
est risk for provider-to-patient transmission of HCV.
Provider-to-Patient Transmission of HIV
In the 25 years since HIV was first isolated, only 4 instances
of HIV transmission from infected health care workers to 1
or more patients have been reported.3-8,41-45 One cluster of
infections occurred in the United States in 1990;3-8 2 cases
occurred in France,41,42,44,45 and 1 instance of transmission
occurred in Spain.43
The US cluster involved a dentist who had acquire immune
deficiency syndrome (AIDS); 6 of his patients became HIV
infected. Their HIV isolates were linked to his, both epide-
miologically and by DNA sequencing.3-8 A thorough inves-
tigation by the CDC and viral phylogeny findings suggest-
ed practitioner-to-patient spread, though the precise mecha-
nism or mechanisms of transmission were not determined.
Although the dentist was a patient in his own practice, no
infection control deficiencies were identified that would read-
ily explain HIV transmission to the 6 patients. Additionally,
the dentist did not recall occupational injuries that could have
created an opportunity for cross-contamination. Despite sub-
stantial speculation, no data were uncovered suggesting in-
tentional transmission.
The second instance of provider-to-patient HIV transmis-
sion involved an orthopedic surgeon in France who trans-
mitted HIV to 1 patient. Transmission was confirmed through
DNA sequence analysis of viral isolates obtained from the
surgeon and the patient.42,45 The surgeon was not aware of
his infection until surveillance case definition AIDS was di-
agnosed. French investigators initiated a look-back study of
the surgeon’s 3004 patients since 1983. Investigators suc-
cessfully contacted 2458 patients and performed HIV sero-
logic tests on 983. One patient was found to have acquired
HIV infection. This patient had 3 procedures performed by
the surgeon, had a negative HIV serology before undergoing
the first of the 3 procedures, and was found to be infect-
ed with HIV when she underwent testing before the third
procedure.42,45 The authors of the manuscript speculated that
both the extended length of the initial procedure (10 hours)
and the high likelihood that the surgeon had a high viral
burden (since he had far advanced, untreated disease) con-
tributed to the transmission. No breaches in recommended
infection-control practices were identified in retrospect.
The third episode of provider-to-patient HIV transmission
also was detected in France. In this unusual case, transmission
of HIV is suggested to have occurred from an infected nurse
to a patient, although no clear mechanism for transmission
could be identified.44 The investigators conducted a look-back
study focusing on 7,580 patients for whom the infected nurse
had provided care. They were able to locate 5,308 patients,
and they serologically tested 2,293.41 No additional infections
were identified. The nurse was coinfected with HCV and had
both a high HIV viral burden and advanced HCV-induced
hepatic disease, including clotting abnormalities. HCV was
apparently not transmitted to the patient, but the HIV isolates
from patient and provider were closely related. The nurse was
guideline on hcws infected with hbv, hcv, and/or hiv 211
unaware of either viral infection, though she became symp-
tomatic enough to require hospitalization within 2 weeks of
the date on which transmission was thought to have occurred.
She denied injection drug use.
The fourth case occurred in Spain; a woman was infected
with HIV by her obstetrician/gynecologist during cesarean
delivery. Spanish officials conducted a look-back evaluation
of the physician’s patients. Of 275 patients on whom the
practitioner had performed procedures, 250 could be tested,
and none were found to be infected.43
More than 4 dozen look-back studies have been conducted
evaluating the HIV antibody status of patients retrospectively
identified as having received medical or dental care from an
HIV-infected practitioner5,46-57 (Lisa Panlilio, CDC, personal
communication). None of these studies identified transmis-
sion of HIV infection. To our knowledge, only the report
from France described above, in which an orthopedic surgeon
infected one of his patients, identified iatrogenic transmission
of HIV in a look-back study.42,45 In the United Kingdom, no
cases of HIV transmission from a healthcare worker to a
patient have been detected, despite 28 patient notification
exercises and testing of more than 11,000 patients between
1988 and 2006 (F. Ncube, MD, Health Protection Agency
Centre for Infections, United Kingdom, personal commu-
nication). One unusual cluster of patient-to-patient HIV
transmission in a surgical practice in Australia has been de-
scribed in the literature;58 however, the practitioner providing
the care was not infected.
pathogenesis and transmission risk
HBV, HCV, and HIV are most readily transmitted either par-
enterally or across mucous membranes. Therefore, experts
uniformly agree that the risk for transmission of these viruses
from an infected provider to a patient during the provision
of routine healthcare that does not involve invasive proce-
dures is negligible. In instances in which invasive procedures,
and even exposure-prone invasive procedures, are being con-
ducted, these risks are still quite small, but are clearly elevated
when compared with other routine patient-care activities. For
this reason, a precise assessment of the magnitude of risk for
transmission of each of the viruses—in the context of pro-
cedures associated with risks for exposing patients to the
infected provider’s blood or virus-containing body fluids—
becomes critical to the overall risk assessment. At least in part
because these transmission events occur uncommonly for
each of these 3 pathogens, such information is difficult to
accumulate.
Several studies have attempted to measure the risk that is
associated with single discrete exposures (eg, the “needlestick”
transmission rate) for transmission of these 3 pathogens. Only
a few manuscripts have addressed the risk to patients who
are cared for by an HBV-infected practitioner,11,14,59-63 an
HCV-infected practitioner,22,23,64-66 or an HIV-infected prac-
titioner5,46-51,54,57,67 Several variables are likely to influence the
transmission rate.
The first factor to influence risk is the intrinsic transmis-
sibility of a specific pathogen. With respect to HBV, studies
from the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated a risk for transmis-
sion associated with a percutaneous (ie, needlestick) exposure
to blood from an HBV-infected individual that ranged from
6% to 37% (19%–37%, if the donor blood is HBeAg-pos-
itive).68,69 The risk for transmission of HCV associated with
such exposures has been estimated at 1%–2% (summarized
in Henderson65). The risk for transmission of HIV associated
with needlestick or percutaneous exposures has been esti-
mated at 0.3% (summarized in Henderson70). With the ex-
ception of the HBV studies (which do make the distinction
between HBeAg-positive and HBeAg-negative source pa-
tients), none of the HCV or HIV transmission studies con-
siders the circulating viral burden of the source patient in
the risk calculation.
With respect to HIV transmission from provider to patient,
since the previous version of this guideline10 was published
in 1997, only 3 instances of transmission have been de-
tected,41-45 and in each instance only 1 patient was found to
be infected, despite exhaustive look-back investigations.
A second important issue for consideration in assessing the
risk for provider-to-patient transmission of bloodborne path-
ogens is the frequency with which providers sustain injuries
that might present a risk for transmission to their patients.71-79
Since the previous version of this guideline10 was published,
numerous strategies and interventions designed to reduce the
risk for occupational exposures for providers have been im-
plemented (discussed in more detail in the later part of this
section). Many of these interventions have been shown to be
efficacious in reducing risks for occupational exposures;80-86
however, in many instances, the use of such interventions
has been suboptimal.87-89 Another set of factors that relates
directly to the frequency with which exposures occur includes
both the experience of the practitioner and the expertise of
the practitioner. With respect to experience, clearly, students
and trainees are more likely to sustain such exposures. A
special problem arises when a training institution becomes
aware that a trainee is chronically infected with a bloodborne
pathogen. Such instances should be handled on a case-by-
case basis, in consultation with the institution’s legal counsel,
the house staff training director, infection control profes-
sionals, the dean of the school, and others who are involved
stakeholders. To date, these cases have been handled unevenly
across the country, with some institutions focusing on the
disability-law aspects and others focusing on liability.90 The
institution should assist the trainee in selecting a career path
best suited to her or his specific situation and should provide
reasonable accommodation to students and trainees who have
disabling conditions. The expertise of the practitioner is more
complex to measure, but may be indirectly assessed by eval-
uating postprocedure infection rates, bleeding and other pro-
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cedure-related complications, and other adverse events as-
sociated with the performance of the practitioner.
The third issue that warrants consideration is how fre-
quently such an exposure occurs and is then followed by
exposure to a patient (ie, the so-called “recontact” or “bleed-
back” risk). For example, intraoperative injuries sustained by
surgical care providers offer an opportunity for “recontact”
to occur. In 2 studies of intraoperative provider injuries,
11.4%–29% of the sharp objects that caused injury to the
provider “recontacted” the patient.73,79 These exposures can
be prevented by immediately replacing the contaminated su-
ture needle or other sharp object before reuse. Recontacts can
also occur when the provider is injured by bone spicules or
materials permanently embedded in the patient’s body.73,79
These sources of potential patient exposure might be pre-
vented by the use of safety devices or other interventions.
For example, such exposures might be prevented by the use
of reinforced gloves,91,92 double-gloving, glove-liners, or other
devices or materials to protect the provider’s hands.89,91,93-96
Gloves constructed of monofilament polymers or other ma-
terials resistant to tears have become available for use when
manipulation of bone fragments or suture wires is needed,
but their use has been associated with a decrease in tactile
sensation. In addition, the use of blunted suture needles has
been shown to decrease the risk of percutaneous injuries to
the surgeon.86,97-99
A fourth factor to consider in the risk assessment is the
effect of the infected provider’s circulating viral burden. How-
ever, with the exception of the HBV studies (which do make
the distinction between HBeAg-positive and HBeAg-negative
source patients), none of the HCV or HIV transmission stud-
ies considers the circulating viral burden of the source patient
in the risk calculation, although the likelihood of HIV trans-
mission is increased if a source case patient has advanced
AIDS and, presumably, an elevated HIV viral load. For HBV,
5 studies have attempted to measure the viral burden of the
provider associated with transmission of infection. In these
studies, source case surgeons were found to have circulating
HBV DNA levels between and GE/mL.4 96.4 # 10 5.0 # 10
In a modeling study designed to assess the inoculum asso-
ciated with the most common types of exposures, viral bur-
dens equivalent to 104 GE/mL or less were associated with
exposures to fewer than 1 virion.100 An analysis of the tech-
nique used by one HBeAg-positive cardiovascular-thoracic
surgeon implicated as the source of a cluster of HBV infec-
tions may shed some light on the risk for transmission as-
sociated with very high viral burdens.12,101 In this study, when
the surgeon repeatedly tied knots, snugging them against his
index finger, shear injuries occurred through his gloves, and
both the saline irrigant used to rinse the inside of his gloves
and the outer surface of the gloves tested positive for hepatitis
B surface antigen (HBsAg).12,101 Despite evidence suggesting
a decreased risk for contamination with blood and/or body
fluids associated with the practice of double-gloving,71 this
surgeon did not wear 2 pairs of gloves—neither during clin-
ical care nor for the experiments described above. Nonethe-
less, because of the extremely high viral burden associated
with HBeAg positivity (100 million to 10 billion HBV par-
ticles per milliliter of blood),102 barriers may be relatively
ineffective in preventing transmission, so the establishment
of some cutoff value makes implicit sense.
A fifth issue to consider is the magnitude of risk of trans-
mission of bloodborne pathogens following various types of
exposures (summarized in Henderson70). For HIV, this risk
has been studied extensively. The average risk of transmission
associated with percutaneous exposures to blood-contami-
nated sharp objects that have been used on HIV-infected
individuals is 0.32% (21 infections associated with 6,498 ex-
posures; 95% confidence interval, 0.18%–0.46%) (summa-
rized in Henderson70). The risk for transmission of HBV from
an HBeAg-positive source subject is approximately 2 log10
higher; the likelihood of transmission of HCV from an HCV-
infected source subject is intermediate, and is estimated to
be approximately 10-fold less than that for HBV (ie, ap-
proximately 1%–2% per exposure).65 The estimated risk for
transmission of HIV associated with mucocutaneous expo-
sure is 0.03% (1 infection associated with 2,885 exposures),
but this estimate is biased, because the single transmission
occurred before prospective data were collected from the in-
volved institution.103 The risk of infection associated with
intact skin exposure to blood from an HIV-infected individual
is below detection in the few studies that have attempted to
measure it.104 Data estimating these latter risks are not avail-
able for either HBV or HCV, though one might reasonably
assume that the risks might be higher for HCV and higher
yet for HBV, given the numbers of cases infection detected
for the hepatitis viruses, as well as the higher average cir-
culating viral burdens in chronically infected individuals.
Because the risks for provider-to-patient transmission of
these 3 bloodborne pathogens are apparently quite different
(albeit there is a small risk for each of the 3 viruses), SHEA
decided in the previous version of this guideline in 1997 to
consider them individually.10 This updated version also fol-
lows that approach.
In 1991, the US Public Health Service published guidelines
designed to prevent provider-to-patient transmission of HBV
and HIV.105 Since that document was published, we have
gained substantial insight into the factors that contribute to
the risks for healthcare-associated transmission of these path-
ogens; we have witnessed substantial progress in the man-
agement of HBV, HCV, and HIV infection; we have seen the
development of sensitive molecular tests designed to measure
circulating viral burdens for these infections; and we have
implemented a variety of interventional strategies designed
to reduce these risks.
More than 20 infectious diseases have been transmitted by
needlestick injuries.106 However, HBV, HCV, and HIV infec-
tions remain overwhelmingly the most important diseases to
consider in provider-to-patient transmission. Other blood-
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borne diseases remain of hypothetical concern only. For this
reason, this guideline will focus only on HBV, HCV, and HIV.
clinical progress since publication
of the 1997 shea guideline
HBV
The previous version of this SHEA guideline10 relied on the
presence of HBeAg as a surrogate marker of infectivity and
did not consider direct measurement of the HBV DNA viral
burden in making recommendations about practice restric-
tions. One major advance since the publication of the pre-
vious guideline is the recognition that presence of HBeAg is
not a sensitive marker for HBV infectivity. Indeed, several
instances of provider-to-patient transmission of HBV have
involved providers who were infected with strains of HBV
that did not produce HBeAg (so-called “pre-core” mu-
tants).14,107 The use of HBeAg as a surrogate marker for in-
fectivity has been effectively replaced by molecular tests that
measure a patient’s circulating viral burdens with precision.
A third major advance is the availability of antiviral medi-
cations and other approaches to treat HBV infection. The
past decade has seen the development of treatment strategies
that, for the first time, offer some hope of reducing patients’
viral burdens, and also of producing durable remissions, if
not cures. The US Food and Drug Administration has ap-
proved 7 antiviral agents (interferon-a, peg interferon, la-
mivudine, telbivudine, adefovir, tenofovir, and entecavir) for
the treatment of chronic hepatitis B in the United States;
others (eg, emtricitabine and clevudine) are currently under
evaluation. Of patients who received monotherapy with one
of the approved agents for 1 year, 14%–30% became negative
for HBeAg, and 21%–67% developed undetectable HBV DNA
levels.108 The role of combination therapies is at too prelim-
inary a stage to judge their efficacy; however, some studies
have suggested that therapy with combinations of some of
the newer nucleoside and nucleotide analogues (eg, truvada)
are superior, or preferable, to monotherapy for patients who
have HBeAg or high circulating levels of HBV DNA.108 Al-
though the evidence base for the use of antiviral and/or im-
munological therapy for hepatitis B is not yet fully adequate
(ie, current therapy for chronic hepatitis B infection most
often does not eradicate HBV and most studies demonstrate
limited long-term efficacy), the role of therapy, the impact
on the potential transmission risk, and the impact on practice
restrictions have not yet been fully investigated.
HCV
As is the case with HBV, in the past decade we have gained
more sophistication and precision in our ability to measure
the circulating viral burdens of patients infected with HCV.
In addition, new antiviral agents and combinations of agents
have been employed with increasing success to treat individ-
uals who have acute and chronic HCV infection. A National
Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conference and
2 academic professional societies have published congruent
treatment guidelines for individuals who are chronically in-
fected with HCV.109-112 These guidelines emphasize that in-
dividuals who have chronic hepatitis C infection who are 18
years of age or older, have detectable HCV RNA in serum,
and evidence of chronic hepatitis (either elevated serum al-
anine aminotransferase levels or active hepatitis and/or fi-
brosis) should be treated, assuming they are willing to par-
ticipate in the therapy and that there are no contraindications
to the use of the indicated antiviral agents. Also of importance
are the several published studies that suggest that acute HCV
infection can be treated with nearly 100% success.113-116
Whether these recommendations might apply to HCV-in-
fected practitioners who want to be able to perform exposure-
prone invasive procedures (whether or not they have evidence
of chronic hepatitis) is not addressed in this guideline.
HIV
Substantial progress also has been made for HIV. Tests to
monitor HIV RNA viral load are now routine, and highly
active antiretroviral therapy has been routinely given for more
than a decade. None of the existing guidelines have incor-
porated treatment of the infected practitioner into the de-
cision about practice restriction for HIV-infected providers
who wish to continue performing exposure-prone invasive
procedures.
current published guidelines
In the United States, in the aftermath of the national and
international publicity surrounding the instances of iatro-
genic HIV infection linked to the Florida dentist,3-8 the CDC
issued guidelines for HIV-infected and HBV-infected provid-
ers105 in July of 1991. From an implementation perspective,
3 aspects of these guidelines were problematic: (1) the need
to classify a subset of invasive procedures as “exposure-
prone,” (2) the requirement that an infected practitioner no-
tify prospective patients of her or his infection status, and
(3) the legal and administrative implementation strategies
concerning the establishment and workings of the Expert
Review Panel, an administrative requirement of the guide-
lines. Although we have witnessed substantial clinical progress
and much has been written about these issues, these problems
remain largely unresolved 18 years after publication of the
original CDC guideline.105
The anxiety associated with the publicity surrounding the
Florida dentist case-cluster prompted Congressional scrutiny
of the 1991 CDC guideline,105 and, ultimately, resulted in the
US Congress passing Federal legislation (PL. 102–141) re-
quiring states to certify that they have implemented the July
1991 CDC guideline105 or “equivalent” guidelines. Interest-
ingly, since the 1991 CDC guideline105 was published, the
United States has identified no additional instances of pro-
vider-to-patient HIV transmission and only rare instances of
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either HCV or HBV transmission. The fact that only a small
number of cases have been detected is attributable to a variety
of factors, including less aggressive case-finding by the CDC
and other local and state public health officials (ie, no active
ongoing surveillance), the use of primary strategies to pre-
vent exposure, and the efficacy of highly active antiretroviral
therapy, which has lowered the viral burden in HIV-infect-
ed “source patients,” has reduced the likelihood of hospital-
ization, and has decreased the need for and the numbers of
invasive procedures that place healthcare workers at risk for
exposure. To date, the management of infected practitioners
therefore appears to have been effectively managed at the
individual, the institutional or at the state level.
Although no new US Public Health Service guidelines re-
garding infected providers have been published since 1991,
guidelines have been published outside the United States, and
several articles have been published that argue differing points
of view about this complex issue. The issue remains contro-
versial for several complicated reasons. First, at least in part
because of the manner in which HIV infection first presented
in society, American public opinion has consistently reflected
a “zero-risk” stance. Second, although most guidelines have
focused on practice restrictions for infected providers who
conduct exposure-prone procedures, a panel of experts con-
vened by the CDC was unable to come to consensus about
which invasive procedures are “exposure-prone,” at least in
part because of the substantial variability from provider to
provider. The United Kingdom guidelines detail their defi-
nition of “exposure-prone” procedures.117 Also, recently, a
group convened at the University of Virginia created a table
of procedures, divided into 3 categories: (1) procedures with
de minimis risk of viral transmission, (2) procedures for
which viral transmission is theoretically possible but unlikely,
and (3) procedures that are associated with a definite risk of
viral transmission or that are directly characterized as ex-
posure prone procedures.1 We have included a similar table
in this guideline (Table 2), modified slightly from the table
created by the University of Virginia group; the committee
that drafted this guideline also expressed the strong opinion
that some procedures listed under Category III might well
be moved to Category II if the practitioner follows recom-
mended work practice controls and uses appropriate safety
devices. Third, this topic offers a unique confluence for the
disciplines of epidemiology, medicine, ethics and law, and
experts in these disciplines express widely divergent views
about the optimal approach. Each of these issues deserves
additional discussion.
Despite the fact that experts uniformly agree that infected
providers who are not conducting invasive procedures present
virtually no risk to their patients, as recently as 2005, a study
found that 89% of respondents acknowledged that they would
want to know whether their doctor or dentist is infected with
HIV; 82% agreed that disclosure of HBV or HCV infection
in a provider should be mandatory; and only 38% thought
that infected providers should be allowed to provide patient
care of any kind.118 Some have argued that by not completely
restricting providers infected with bloodborne pathogens, the
discipline of medicine has betrayed its responsibility to pa-
tients.119 Because public opinion is far from aligned with the
existing science base, a major issue becomes “What level of
risk will society tolerate?”
ethical issues
A useful perspective is to consider the accommodations so-
ciety has made for medical or psychiatric conditions in the
healthcare worker, or a history of substance use, which also
could put patients at risk. In certain cases, these conditions
may necessitate restriction of the healthcare worker from cer-
tain aspects of healthcare practice. Restriction is not viewed
as justified, however, when these conditions are well treated
and the healthcare provider is able to practice in a safe and
competent way.
Similarly, we feel that infection with a bloodborne pathogen
does not itself justify restriction on the practice of an oth-
erwise competent healthcare provider. As with providers who
have medical, psychiatric, or substance-use problems, health-
care providers infected with bloodborne pathogens should
seek ongoing care and treatment. SHEA recommends the
additional protection of restricting health care providers from
performing Category III procedures if the healthcare provider
is infected with a bloodborne pathogen and meets other cri-
teria, as delineated in this document.
The ethics of this issue are also complex. Healthcare pro-
viders have an ethical, professional and fiduciary responsi-
bility to act in the best interests of their patients. Healthcare
providers have a duty to ensure patient safety. The fact that
healthcare providers are bound by the principle of nonma-
leficence, which requires them to do no harm to patients and
to do what is possible to prevent harm, is widely accepted.
Nonetheless, this simple formulation of the principle of non-
maleficence provides limited guidance, because many bene-
ficial interventions also present risks to patients. Consistent
with the principle of nonmaleficence or “do not harm,”
healthcare providers are expected to act in accordance with
the standards of their profession to prevent harm in the prac-
tice of patient care. Accordingly, healthcare providers have
an obligation to follow the accepted standards of practice to
prevent the transmission of bloodborne pathogens to pa-
tients. These standards include knowledge about and diligent
utilization of infection control procedures, as well as care-
ful attention to individual factors that can be controlled to re-
duce any risk of transmission.
Over the last 2 decades, considerable progress has been
made in our understanding of HIV, HCV, and HBV infec-
tions. Sensitive tests to measure levels of circulating virus have
been developed, as well as an impressive armamentarium of
interventions to control the infections, including effective an-
tiviral therapies for each disease. We know that when indi-
viduals are treated so that their viral load becomes and re-
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mains low or undetectable, the risk of transmission to others
is greatly decreased. Technological and other advances in
equipment and infection control procedures, as well as work-
practice controls that have reduced the risk of occupational
injuries to healthcare providers and, therefore, indirectly im-
proved patient safety, have further reduced the risk of trans-
mission in healthcare settings.
The accumulated experience and data provide reassuring
evidence that the magnitude of risk for provider-to-patient
transmission of HIV, HCV and HBV, although not zero, is
exceedingly small. At the same time, the burdens of certain
restrictions that have been placed on healthcare providers out
of concern for patient safety have been disproportionately
high. Qualified and experienced healthcare providers have
suffered from discrimination, loss of privacy, liability, and
loss of their jobs and their livelihoods. These burdens, as-
sociated with highly personal and stigmatizing diagnoses,
seem unjustified in the face of an extremely low risk that can
be further reduced by reasonable accommodations in the
workplace and the diligence of healthcare providers and
institutions.
All healthcare providers should comply with institutional
policies and procedures designed to protect patients. Health-
care providers have an ethical responsibility to promote their
own health and well being, and a responsibility to remove
themselves from care situations if it is clear that there is a
significant risk to patients despite appropriate preventive
measures.
Infection with a bloodborne pathogen does not itself justify
restriction on the practice of an otherwise competent health-
care provider. Healthcare providers infected with bloodborne
pathogens should seek ongoing care and treatment. Restric-
tions may be justifiably imposed when a healthcare provider
has a physical or mental impairment that affects his or her
judgment and/or jeopardizes patient safety. Examples might
include exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis; a history of
poor infection-control technique or adherence to proper
technique; mental confusion; or a prior incident of trans-
mitting a bloodborne pathogen to a patient.
legal issues
From the legal perspective, the courts have been relatively
unsupportive of infected healthcare providers. Although some
authorities have argued that proscriptive state regulations are
responding “to a problem that does not exist,”120 many legal
actions were filed against infected healthcare providers and
their institutions, based either on the CDC guidelines of July
1991,10 professional societies’ adoption of these guidelines, or
both. In many, if not most of these actions, a practitioner
was sued, not for infecting patients, but rather for inflicting
mental anguish, for causing “pain and suffering,” for assault,
for the practitioner’s failure to comply with the “duty to
warn” the patient of risk, or for various other legal issues.
Virtually all of these suits were filed because of the possibility
that patients may have been unnecessarily exposed to the risk
for infection, not because the patients were infected with
bloodborne pathogens. Outcomes for these cases have been
highly variable, and have not, to our knowledge, established
a definitive precedent.
HBV
Existing US guidelines, published in 1991 and not, to date,
ever revised,105 recommend that “healthcare providers who
perform exposure-prone procedures and who do not have
serologic evidence of immunity to HBV from vaccination or
from previous infection should know their HBsAg status and,
if that is positive, should also know their HBeAg status. If
infected with HBV (and HBeAg positive) providers should
not perform exposure-prone procedures unless they have
sought counsel from an Expert Review Panel and been advised
under what circumstances, if any, they may continue to per-
form these procedures. Such circumstances would include
notifying prospective patients of the healthcare worker’s se-
ropositivity before they undergo exposure-prone invasive
procedures.”105
Several countries have issued modified guidelines for the
management of HBV-infected providers based on the infected
provider’s circulating viral burdens. Unfortunately, the evi-
dence base for these recommendations is minuscule, and the
existing recommendations are quite disparate.
In the United Kingdom, HBV-infected providers who are
HBeAg positive may not conduct exposure-prone invasive
procedures; HBV-infected providers who are HBeAg negative
but have HBV DNA levels of greater than 103 GE/mL may
not conduct exposure-prone invasive procedures; and HBV-
infected providers who are HBeAg negative and have HBV
DNA levels of less than 103 GE/mL may conduct exposure-
prone invasive procedures but must be retested at least every
12 months to ensure that the level of viremia remains below
103 GE/mL.121 More recently, authorities in the United King-
dom have also recommended122 that HBV-infected healthcare
providers who are HBeAg negative and who have pretreat-
ment HBV DNA levels of 103–105 GE/mL could be allowed
to perform exposure prone procedures if they are receiving
suppressive oral antiviral therapy and if their viral loads have
decreased to below 103 GE/mL. The major challenge asso-
ciated with this latter recommendation is the development
of an effective monitoring strategy to make certain that the
circulating viral burden remains less than 103 GE/mL.122 The
availability of various testing systems further complicates
monitoring.
A European consortium was convened to create recom-
mendations for HBV-infected providers and reached slightly
different conclusions.123 In their recommendations, HBV-in-
fected providers who are HBeAg positive are instructed that
they may not perform exposure-prone procedures.123 HBV-
infected providers who are HBeAg negative but have HBV
DNA levels of less than 104 GE/mL may conduct exposure-
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prone invasive procedures but must be retested at least an-
nually to make certain that the circulating viral burden re-
mains below 104 GE/mL.123 These guidelines also emphasize
that providers who are detected as having transmitted HBV
should not perform exposure-prone procedures, and HBV-
infected providers who have been treated and whose post-
treatment DNA levels have fallen to less than 104 GE/mL may
conduct exposure-prone procedures but must be retested ev-
ery 3 months to ensure that the viral burden remains below
104 GE/mL.123
Scientists from the Netherlands published a third set of rec-
ommendations suggesting that HBV-infected providers who
have HBV DNA levels of less than 105 GE/mL may conduct
exposure-prone invasive procedures, but must be retested at
least annually.124
In a thoughtful analysis, van der Eijk et al125 listed the chal-
lenges to standardizing recommendations for practice restric-
tions for HBV-infected providers, emphasizing that guidelines
have to strike a balance between excluding providers unnec-
essarily and patient safety. More recently, the Viral Hepatitis
Prevention Board, a European consortium whose mission is
to contribute to the control and prevention of viral hepatitis,
convened a meeting of international experts from the public
and private sectors to try to harmonize these recommenda-
tions.126 This meeting identified a number of issues that the
contributors felt needed to be addressed before development
of standardized recommendations, and consensus could not
be achieved.126 Included in this list of issues are the following:
(1) the variability of HBV DNA levels among chronically
infected individuals; (2) the paucity of data linking levels of
viremia to risk for transmission; (3) the variable reliability
and reproducibility of the molecular tests used to measure
HBV DNA, as well as the variability between the differing
test systems; (4) the lack of standardization among the dif-
ferent tests used to detect HBV DNA; and (5) the variability
and durability of therapeutic antiviral effects and, specifically,
the length of time viremia can be effectively suppressed before
“escape” mutant viruses emerge.
HCV
No US Public Health Service guidelines address the man-
agement of providers infected with HCV, including the 1991
CDC recommendations.105The UK guidelines109 are quite pro-
scriptive regarding hepatitis C, stating that HCV-infected pro-
viders who have circulating HCV RNA may not conduct
exposure-prone invasive procedures. Further, trainees found
to have circulating HCV RNA should be restricted from start-
ing training in exposure-prone invasive procedures.127 The
UK guidelines also address treatment, noting that HCV-in-
fected providers who have circulating HCV RNA who receive
antiviral treatment and become HCV RNA negative for a
period of 6 months can be permitted to return to performing
exposure-prone invasive procedures but must be retested in
6 months to confirm the durability of the response.109
The European Consortium could not reach consensus
about the management of HCV-infected providers, conclud-
ing that “on balance it is not recommended that exposure-
prone procedures be forbidden for HCV-infected healthcare
workers.”123 Similarly, the scientists from the Netherlands ad-
dressed only HBV infection, and did not discuss HCV-in-
fected providers.124 Furthermore, the findings of the Viral
Hepatitis Prevention Board with respect to HBV (eg, variable
HBV DNA levels, paucity of data linking levels of viremia to
risk for transmission, variable rates of reliability and repro-
ducibility of molecular tests used to measure HBV DNA,
variability and lack of standardization of the differing test
systems, variability and durability of therapeutic antiviral ef-
fects, and length of time viremia can be effectively suppressed
before “escape” mutant viruses emerge) also apply to indi-
viduals chronically infected with HCV.
HIV
The UK guidelines117 recommend restriction of the practice
of HIV-infected providers.105 The US guidelines recommend
that HIV-infected practitioners, “not perform exposure-prone
procedures unless they have sought counsel from an Expert
Review Panel and been advised under what circumstances, if
any, they may continue to perform these procedures. Such
circumstances would include notifying prospective patients
of the HCW’s seropositivity before they undergo exposure-
prone invasive procedures.”105 Neither guideline bases rec-
ommendations on the clinical status of the infected provider
or on the viral burden of the HIV-infected provider.
current assessment
SHEA emphasizes that, more than 20 years after the publi-
cation of the “Universal Precautions” guidelines,128 blood and
potentially contaminated body fluids (eg, cerebrospinal fluid,
peritoneal fluid, amniotic fluid, pleural fluid, synovial fluid,
pericardial fluid, semen, vaginal secretion, and any blood-
contaminated fluid) from any patient must be considered to
have the potential to transmit bloodborne pathogens, irre-
spective of the patient’s primary or secondary diagnosis. Al-
though this principle was initially intended to apply to pa-
tients, we find it equally relevant to healthcare providers who
may be infected with HIV, HBV, HCV, and/or another blood-
borne pathogen. The magnitude of risk for provider-to-pa-
tient transmission of bloodborne pathogens may never be
known with precision; however, the additional experience
gained over the past 20 years provides reassuring evidence
that these risks are extremely small.
In the previous version of this guideline, SHEA expressed
the opinion that most of the issues applicable to HBV-infected
providers would generally apply to providers who are infected
with HIV and might also hold for providers infected with
HCV. In this revised version, SHEA decided to deal with each
of the pathogens individually—at least with respect to setting
policies for infected providers. This decision was made for a
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table 4. Definitions of the Strength of Recommendations and the Quality of the Evidence Supporting
Them
Category and grade Definition
Strength of recommendation
A Good evidence to support a recommendation for use
B Moderate evidence to support a recommendation for use
C Poor evidence to support a recommendation for or against use
D Moderate evidence to support a recommendation against use
E Good evidence to support a recommendation against use
Quality of evidence
I Evidence exists from at least one properly randomized, controlled trial
II Evidence comes from at least one well-designed clinical trial without
randomization, from cohort or case-controlled analytic studies
(preferably from more than one center), from multiple time-series
studies, or from dramatic results in uncontrolled experiments
III Evidence comes from opinions of respected authorities, based on clin-
ical experience, descriptive studies, or reports of expert committees
note. The classification scheme is that developed by the Infectious Diseases Society of America,134 which are
adapted from the Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health Examination.135
variety of reasons. First, the “average” risk for transmission
following a single parenteral exposure is at least 10-fold and
probably 100-fold higher for HBV than for HIV. The risk for
HCV transmission appears to be intermediate between those
for HIV and HBV.65 Second, chronic carriers of these 3 viral
pathogens typically exhibit substantial differences in viral bur-
den (ie, the number of intact virions per milliliter of blood);
thus, circumstances that might involve a measurable risk for
transmission of HBV may not necessarily be associated with
a measurable risk for transmission of HIV. Third, postex-
posure management strategies, including treatment, have
evolved considerably, and treatment for each of these diseases
since the previous version of this guideline was published.
Pre-exposure receipt of hepatitis B vaccine has led to a dra-
matic decrease in the incidence of HBV infection in healthcare
personnel. Further, postexposure prophylaxis for HBV infec-
tion using hepatitis B immune globulin and/or hepatitis B
vaccine is both safe and highly effective. Although its efficacy
has not been proven in a clinical trial, postexposure pro-
phylaxis for HIV infection using 2-drug or 3-drug combi-
nations has likely contributed to the dramatic decrease in
occupationally acquired HIV infection in healthcare workers
in the United States. The last such case documented by the
CDC occurred in 1999.70,129 Unfortunately, neither pre-ex-
posure nor postexposure prophylaxis exist for HCV.
For these reasons, the version of this guideline will continue
to consider each pathogen individually. The following rec-
ommendations are based on the following information: (1)
available scientific information about the magnitude of risk
for provider-to-patient transmission of the bloodborne path-
ogens; (2) clinical hospital epidemiology and infection control
experience and management of HBV, HCV and HIV related
problems in the healthcare setting since 1981; and (3) expe-
rience with the implementation and interpretation of prior
recommendations and guidelines, including those issued pre-
viously by the US Public Health Service.102,130-133 The recom-
mendations are classified according to the scheme developed
by the Infectious Diseases Society of America134 (Table 4).
guideline recommendations
background and rationale
These recommendations are based on the thorough consid-
eration of the risks for provider-to-patient transmission of
these pathogens, from the information provided by (1) the
past 50 years’ experience with these pathogens in the health-
care setting; (2) the reported experience with HBV-infected
providers and their patients11-16,61-63,136 (I. Williams, CDC, Per-
sonal Communication), HCV-infected providers and their
patients,18-32,35,37,39,40,64 and HIV-infected providers and their
patients3-8,41-57; (3) studies of the frequency of various types
of occupational exposures65,71-79,137,138; (4) studies of the mag-
nitude of risk of transmission of bloodborne pathogens fol-
lowing various types of exposures70,104,139,140; (5) the substantial
progress biomedical science has made in accurately measuring
viral burden as an indicator of disease activity, and, possibly,
infectivity, for all 3 viral infections; (6) the availability of an
effective vaccine for HBV; (7) the development of effective
postexposure management strategies, as well as therapy that
can substantially suppress HIV and HBV infection and can
suppress and even cure HCV infection; (8) progress made in
modifying procedures and devices to create a safer healthcare
environment; and (9) the resources required to develop a
unique administrative approach for the management of pro-
viders infected with these 3 bloodborne pathogens.
The major changes in the risk calculus since the publication
of our prior set of recommendations are, first, that effective
antiviral therapeutic interventions have been developed for
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all 3 pathogens, and, second, that a number of engineering
and work-practice controls have been introduced into the
healthcare environment that have contributed substantially
to decreasing the risk for occupational injuries to healthcare
providers and, therefore, indirectly, to improving patient
safety.
i . practice issues
1. Should healthcare providers who are infected with HBV
be allowed to practice? If so, under what clinical,
serological, or viral burden parameters?
Recommendation
All blood and potentially blood-containing fluids (ie, cerebro-
spinal fluid, peritoneal fluid, amniotic fluid, pleural fluid, synovial
fluid, pericardial fluid, semen, vaginal secretion, and any blood-
contaminated fluid) from patients and providers must be regarded
as potentially infectious for HBV (A-III). All providers should
follow the tenets of Standard Precautions (A-III). Only the fol-
lowing body fluids have been implicated in the transmission of
bloodborne viruses: blood, blood products, semen, cervical se-
cretions, cerebrospinal fluid, peritoneal fluid, pleural fluid, syn-
ovial fluid, pericardial fluid, and amniotic fluid. Transfers of blood
or other potentially infectious materials from providers to patients
must be avoided (A-III). Tears, saliva, vomitus, sputum, urine and
stool are not considered to be capable of transmitting bloodborne
viruses unless contaminated with blood. Nonetheless, healthcare
providers should practice Standard Precautions and avoid contact
with these fluids, as they are potentially infectious for additional
pathogens (eg, saliva for herpes simplex virus, stool for hepatitis A
virus).
HBV-infected healthcare providers should not be prohibited
from participating in patient-care activities solely on the basis of
their HBV infection (A-III). HBV-infected providers should not
be restricted from participating in Category I or Category II Pro-
cedures (Table 2) (A-III). Providers infected with HBV who are
either HBeAg positive or who have circulating viral burdens
greater than or equal to 104 GE/mL should refrain from per-
forming Category III procedures (A-III). Healthcare providers
who have circulating HBV burdens of less than 104 GE/mL should
be allowed to perform those Category III activities identified as
associated with a risk for provider-to-patient transmission of
bloodborne pathogens, so long as the infected provider (1) is not
detected as having transmitted infection to patients; (2) obtains
advice from an Expert Review Panel about continued practice;
(3) undergoes follow-up routinely by Occupational Medicine staff
(or an appropriate public health official), who tests the provider
twice per year to demonstrate the maintenance of a viral burden
of less than 104 GE/mL; (4) also receives follow-up by a personal
physician who has expertise in the management of HBV infection
and who is allowed by the provider to communicate with the
Expert Review Panel about the provider’s clinical status; (5) con-
sults with an expert about optimal infection control procedures
(and strictly adheres to the recommended procedures, including
the routine use of double-gloving for Category II and Category
III procedures and frequent glove changes during procedures,
particularly if performing technical tasks known to compromise
glove integrity [eg, placing sternal wires]); and (6) agrees to the
information in and signs a contract or letter from the Expert
Review Panel that characterizes her or his responsibilities (dis-
cussed in more detail in Recommendation 8, below) (A-III).
Discussion. We have chosen a cut-off of 104 GE/mL to sep-
arate providers who can and cannot perform Category III
procedures. This level was chosen in the absence of data that
definitively associate a given level with either a clear risk for
transmission or, more importantly, an absence of risk. As
noted above, one modeling experiment suggested that the
most common types of exposure to a provider who had a
viral burden of 104 GE/mL would be associated with an ex-
posure to less than 1 virion.100 In addition to that modeling
experiment, another important piece of evidence that sup-
ports this threshold is the fact that, in all of the instances of
transmission from an HBeAg-negative provider to a patient
in which the source provider’s viral burden has been mea-
sured, the implicated provider had a circulating viral burden
in excess of 104 GE/mL,123 except in one case,141 and the
validity of that one case has been questioned, because the
sample was taken from the provider more than 3 months
after the transmission occurred.124 Setting the cutoff for the
circulating HBV viral burden at 103 GE/mL would have re-
sulted in restricting the practices of 58% of the HBV-infected
providers in the United Kingdom and nearly 95% of such
providers in the Netherlands.126
These guidelines suggest a cutoff of 104 GE/mL and allow
an individual who has a circulating viral load of less than 104
GE/mL to continue to conduct Category III procedures as
long as the individual (1) is not detected as having transmitted
infection to patients; (2) obtains advice from an Expert Re-
view Panel about continued practice; (3) undergoes follow-
up routinely by Occupational Medicine staff (or an appro-
priate public health official), who tests the provider twice per
year to demonstrate the maintenance of a viral burden of less
than 104 GE/mL; (4) also receives follow-up by a personal
physician who has expertise in the management of HBV in-
fection and who is allowed by the provider to communicate
with the Expert Review Panel about the provider’s clinical
status; (5) consults with an infection control expert about
optimal infection control procedures (and strictly adheres to
the recommended procedures, including the routine use of
double-gloving for Category II and Category III procedures,
use of puncture-resistant gloves, use of blunted surgical
needles,86,97-99 use of “hands-free” technique,142 and other
work practice controls, among many others); and (6) agrees
to the information in and signs a contract or letter from the
Expert Review Panel that characterizes her or his responsi-
bilities (discussed in more detail in Recommendation 8, be-
low). If a provider is receiving treatment for this infection,
the efficacy of the treatment should be considered in the
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context of the specific infection being treated. In general,
because of their very high viral burdens, providers who have
acute HBV infection and those who have HBV infection in
the absence of immunological responses should not perform
Category III procedures. Providers whose infections have re-
solved and who have no evidence of circulating virus should
not be restricted in any way.
Individuals relying on these guidelines must keep in mind
that each such case must be evaluated on its own merit and
that the molecular testing strategies discussed in the docu-
ment are subject to several limitations. These include (1) the
fact that infected individuals’ HBV DNA levels may vary over
time, (2) there are limited scientific data linking levels of
viremia to risk for transmission, (3) the fact that the different
currently marketed test for measuring HBV viral burden may
produce variable results (4) the varying level of reproduci-
bility of these molecular tests, (5) the fact that antiviral ther-
apy may produce transient or limited responses (particularly
with respect to monotherapy for HBV), and (6) the variety
of virological and patient-related factors (eg, adherence to the
recommended antiviral regimen) that may contribute to the
development of “escape” mutants. SHEA underscores that
these guidelines are, of necessity, malleable and modifiable
as more information becomes available.
Antiviral therapy clearly reduces the circulating HBV viral
burden to levels below acceptable cutoff values.143 Since, to
date, therapies have been suppressive and not curative, this
approach is associated with the clear possibility of antiviral
agent–related toxicity, as well as the theoretical possibility of
fostering resistance among viruses from the infected provider.
The effect of therapy should be considered carefully by the
Occupational Medicine physician and the Expert Review
Panel, as well as by the provider’s personal physician who
has expertise in the management of HBV infection.
2. Should healthcare providers who are infected with HCV
be allowed to practice? If so, under what clinical,
serological or viral burden parameters?
Recommendation
HCV-infected providers should not be prohibited from partici-
pating in patient-care activities solely on the basis of their HCV
infection (A-III).
HCV-infected providers should not be restricted from partic-
ipating in Category I or Category II Procedures (A-III); providers
infected with HCV who have circulating viral burdens of greater
than or equal to 104 GE/mL should refrain from performing
Category III procedures (B-III).
Healthcare providers who have circulating HCV burdens of
less than 104 GE/mL should be allowed to perform those Category
III activities identified as associated with a risk for provider-to-
patient transmission of bloodborne pathogens, so long as the
infected provider (1) is not detected as having transmitted in-
fection to patients; (2) obtains advice from an Expert Review
Panel about continued practice; (3) undergoes follow-up rou-
tinely by Occupational Medicine staff (or an appropriate public
health official), who tests the provider twice per year to dem-
onstrate the maintenance of a viral burden of less than 104 GE/
mL; (4) also receives follow-up by a personal physician who has
expertise in the management of HCV infection and who is allowed
by the provider to communicate with the Expert Review Panel
about the provider’s clinical status; (5) consults with an expert
about optimal infection control procedures (and strictly adheres
to the recommended procedures, including the routine use of
double-gloving for Category II and Category III procedures and
frequent glove changes during procedures, particularly if per-
forming technical tasks known to compromise glove integrity [eg,
placing sternal wires]); and (6) agrees to the information in and
signs a contract or letter from the Expert Review Panel that char-
acterizes her or his responsibilities (discussed in more detail in
Recommendation 8, below) (B-III).
Discussion. These guidelines recommend that HCV-in-
fected healthcare providers who have circulating viral burdens
of less than 104 GE/mL not be restricted from any aspect of
health care so long as the infected provider follows the detail
of the recommendation. Specifically, the provider must be
willing to consult with, and follow the recommendations of,
an infection control expert. The infected provider must
strictly adhere to the recommended procedures (eg, routine
use of double-gloving for Category II and III procedures,
frequent glove changes during procedures, particularly if per-
forming technical tasks known to compromise glove integrity
[eg, placing sternal wires], use of puncture-resistant gloves,
blunted surgical needles,86,97-99 “hands-free” technique142,144
and other work practice controls, among many others). Fi-
nally, the infected provider must agree to the information in,
and sign, a contract or letter from the Expert Review Panel
that characterizes her or his responsibilities. One might have
easily argued for no restrictions whatsoever for HCV-infected
providers, on the basis of the experience in the United States
alone.
The selection of a practice-restriction-threshold of 104 GE/
mL is arbitrary, but, as noted above (in the section Legal
Issues), some European guidelines have taken a far more
restrictive tack. Because there have been virtually no such
cases in the United States, we have, nonetheless, chosen a
conservative cutoff for restricting practitioners. We have rec-
ommended practice restrictions for providers who perform
Category III procedures whose viral burdens are 104 GE/mL
or greater. We have based this decision on the in vitro HBV
data cited above (in the section Pathogenesis and Transmis-
sion Risk), as well as the clinical experience with patient-to-
provider transmission of HCV in the United Kingdom. In
addition, we note that therapy for HCV is becoming increas-
ingly effective, so that many providers who are identified as
infected with HCV can have their infections eradicated. Stud-
ies of the efficacy of the treatment of acute HCV infection
often demonstrate cure rates in excess of 95%, with studies
of the treatment of chronically infected individuals demon-
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strating cure rates of up to 70% or 80%, particularly for
individuals infected with a treatment-favorable genotype.145-147
Individuals relying on these guidelines must keep in mind
that each such case must be evaluated on its own merit and
that the molecular testing strategies discussed in the docu-
ment are subject to several limitations. These include (1) the
fact that infected individuals’ HCV RNA levels may vary over
time, (2) the paucity of scientific data linking levels of viremia
to risk for transmission, (3) the fact that the different cur-
rently marketed test for measuring HCV viral burden may
produce variable results, (4) the varying level of reproduci-
bility of these molecular tests, (5) the fact that antiviral ther-
apy may produce transient or limited responses, and (6) the
variety of virological and patient-related factors (eg, adher-
ence to the recommended antiviral regimen) that may con-
tribute to the development of “escape” mutants. SHEA un-
derscores that these guidelines are, of necessity, malleable and
modifiable as more information becomes available.
3. Should healthcare providers who are infected with HIV
be allowed to practice? If so, under what clinical,
serological or viral burden parameters?
Recommendation
HIV-infected healthcare providers should not be prohibited from
participating in patient-care activities solely on the basis of their
HIV infection (A-III). HIV-infected providers should not be re-
stricted from participating in Category I or Category II proce-
dures; providers infected with HIV who have circulating viral
burdens equal to or in excess of GE/mL should refrain25 # 10
from performing Category III procedures (A-III). Healthcare pro-
viders who have circulating HIV burdens of less than 25 # 10
GE/mL should be allowed to perform those Category III activities
identified as associated with a risk for provider-to-patient trans-
mission of bloodborne pathogens, so long as the infected provider
(1) is not detected as having transmitted infection to patients;
(2) obtains advice from an Expert Review Panel about continued
practice; (3) undergoes follow-up routinely by Occupational
Medicine staff, who test the provider twice per year to demon-
strate the maintenance of a viral burden of less than GE/25 # 10
mL; (4) also receives follow-up by a personal physician who has
expertise in the management of HIV infection and who is allowed
by the provider to communicate with the Expert Review Panel
about the provider’s clinical status; (5) consults with an expert
about optimal infection control procedures (and strictly adheres
to the recommended procedures, including the routine use of
double-gloving for Category II and Category III procedures and
frequent glove changes during procedures, particularly if per-
forming technical tasks known to compromise glove integrity [eg,
placing sternal wires]); and (6) agrees to the information in and
signs a contract or letter from the Expert Review Panel that char-
acterizes her or his responsibilities (discussed in more detail in
Recommendation 8, below) (B-III).
Discussion. These guidelines recommend that HIV-infected
healthcare providers who have circulating viral burdens of
less than GE/mL not be restricted from any aspect25 # 10
of health care, so long as the infected provider follows the
detail of the recommendation. Specifically, the provider must
be willing to consult with, and follow the recommendations
of, an infection control expert. The infected provider must
strictly adhere to the recommended procedures, (eg, routine
use of double-gloving for Category II and III procedures;
frequent glove changes during procedures, particularly if
performing technical tasks known to compromise glove in-
tegrity [eg, placing sternal wires]; use of puncture-resistant
gloves blunted surgical needles,86,97-99 and “hands-free” tech-
nique,142,144 and other work practice controls, among many
others). Finally, the infected provider must agree to the in-
formation in, and sign, a contract or letter from the Expert
Review Panel that characterizes her or his responsibilities.
As is the case for our recommendations for HBV-infected
practitioners and HCV-infected practitioners, we acknowl-
edge that the selection of a practice-restriction-threshold of
GE/mL is arbitrary; however, as noted above (in the25 # 10
section on Legal Issues), European guidelines have taken a
far more restrictive tack. Because no provider-to-patient
transmissions of HIV infection have been detected in the
United States since the initial cases involving the Florida den-
tist (discussed in more detail in the sections Epidemiology
and Current Published Guidelines, above), we have chosen
to recommend permitting an HIV-infected practitioner to
conduct Category III procedures if his or her viral burden is
suppressed below GE/mL. We chose GE/mL2 25 # 10 5 # 10
as the threshold, in part, because individuals who typically
have their viral burdens suppressed to the “undetectable”
range (generally !50 copies/mL) occasionally have levels that
spike to GE/mL, despite ongoing effective antiret-25 # 10
roviral therapy. We have recommended practice restrictions
for a provider who performs Category III procedures and has
a viral burden of GE/mL or greater. Because this25 # 10
recommendation represents a substantial departure from oth-
er similar guidelines, we have recommended a relatively low
threshold for restriction. Since data do not exist to provide
evidence for the most appropriate threshold, this lower thresh-
old was selected solely on the basis of opinions of the committee
that drafted this guideline. This threshold should be revisited
on a regular basis and modified on the basis of additional
accumulating experience. Our committee also noted that highly
active antiretroviral therapy is continuing to improve to the
point that most HIV-infected providers can have their infec-
tions suppressed to this level or below. SHEA underscores that
these guidelines are, of necessity, malleable and can be modified
as more information becomes available.
Individuals relying on these guidelines must keep in mind
that each such case must be evaluated on its own merit and
that the molecular testing strategies discussed in the docu-
ment are subject to several limitations. These include (1) the
fact that infected individuals’ circulating HIV levels may vary
over time, (2) the paucity of scientific data linking levels of
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viremia to risk for transmission, (3) the fact that the different
currently marketed test for measuring viral burden may pro-
duce variable results, (4) the current variability in the level
of reproducibility of these molecular tests, (5) the fact that
antiviral therapy may produce transient or limited responses,
and (6) the variety of virological and patient-related factors
(eg, adherence to the recommended antiviral regimen) that
may contribute to the development of “escape” mutants. In
general, because of their very high viral burdens, providers
who are experiencing the HIV seroconversion illness should
not perform Category III procedures.
4. For providers who are infected with HBV, HCV, and/or
HIV and who have circulating viral burdens greater than
the recommended cutoff values, which procedures should
they be precluded from performing?
Recommendation
HBV, HCV, and HIV infected providers should not be restricted
from participating in Category I or Category II Procedures solely
on the basis of their bloodborne pathogen infection (A-III). HBV-
infected providers who are either HBeAg positive or who have
circulating HBV burdens greater than or equal to 104 GE/mL
should refrain from conducting procedures listed in Category III
(A-III). HCV-infected providers who have circulating viral bur-
dens greater than or equal to 104 GE/mL should refrain from
conducting procedures listed in Category III (B-III). HIV-infected
providers who have circulating viral burdens greater than or equal
to GE/mL should refrain from conducting procedures25 # 10
listed in Category III (A-III).
Discussion. Historically, the concept of “exposure-prone”
procedures has been a point of controversy, though several
more recent guidelines and manuscripts have suggested that
“exposure-prone” procedures can be defined.1,109,117,121 In the
previous version of this guideline, SHEA suggested that “ex-
posure-prone” procedures might be defined as those that have
been “epidemiologically implicated” in patient-to-provider
transmission. This approach has proved to be flawed; for
example, one recent case-cluster of provider-to-patient trans-
mission of HBV suggested that the implantation of electro-
encephalography electrodes was implicated in the transmis-
sion of HBV.16 No guideline would include implantation of
electroencephalography electrodes as an “exposure-prone”
procedure. Some authorities have suggested that providers,
rather than procedures, might be exposure-prone, suggesting
that technical expertise and experience may play a more sub-
stantive role in the risk for provider-to-patient exposure,
rather than the procedures themselves. We favor a modifi-
cation of the approach taken by Reitsma et al1; namely, 3
tiers of procedural risk (Table 2). Most guidelines do not
consider the impact of the introduction of safer devices and
safer work practice controls to the risk calculus for infections
with these 3 pathogens. As noted above in the section Path-
ogenesis and Transmission Risk, the use of reinforced
gloves,91,92 double gloves, glove-liners, or other devices or
materials to protect the provider’s hands,89,91,93-96 and use of
blunted suture needles,86,97-99 as well as a variety of other safer
devices and work practices, have been shown to decrease the
risks for percutaneous injuries. The members of the com-
mittee drafting this guideline emphasized that the consistent
use of safety devices by a practitioner should be one factor
considered by the Expert Review Panel when deciding about
practice restrictions. Some members of the committee felt
that consistent use of these procedures and techniques might
move some procedures from Category III to Category II for
individual practitioners.
5. If restricted from performing certain types of
procedures, should providers who are infected with HBV,
HCV, and/or HIV be restricted on the basis of (A) clinical
status, (B) laboratory parameters of disease activity and/or
progression (and, if so, at what specific “set-points” for
each infection), and/or (C) clinical performance (eg,
technical skill or lack of adherence to important infection
control procedures); and if so, who measures and who
decides, and what are the criteria for restriction?
Recommendation
Healthcare practice restrictions should be based on several factors,
including (1) evidence of transmission of infection to patients;
(2) advice from the Expert Review Panel about continued practice,
(3) advice from the Occupational Medicine specialist who is fol-
lowing up the provider, (4) advice from the provider’s physician
who has expertise in the bloodborne pathogen infection, (5) viral
burden measurements of greater than or equal to 104 GE/mL (for
HBV or HCV infection) or greater than or equal to GE/25 # 10
mL (for HIV infection), (6) lack of adherence to recommended
infection control procedures, and (7) inability to safely provide
patient care (eg, development of another contagious disease such
as tuberculosis or development of a bloodborne pathogen–as-
sociated disorder, such as HIV-associated neurological disease)
(A-III).
Discussion. SHEA recommends that restrictions should be
based on various combinations of these data. Anyone clearly
implicated in the transmission of one of these organisms
should become the subject of scrutiny. The factors listed
above (ie, clinical status, laboratory parameters, and clinical
performance) all contribute to the assessment of the indi-
vidual’s ability to practice safely. This ongoing assessment is
one of the important roles that should be assumed by the
Expert Review Panel (discussed in detail in Recommendation
8, below). The expert review panel and the occupational med-
icine physician should also consider the possibility of nar-
cotics diversion in the transmission of these infections. Pro-
viders identified as acutely infected with any of these path-
ogens should be carefully evaluated for viral burdens and
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should engage the expert review panel through their occu-
pational medicine and/or public health practitioners.
6. Should students, residents, fellows, and other trainees
who are infected with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV be
discouraged from entering certain specialties and/or
subspecialities? How and by whom should these decisions
be made?
Recommendation
Healthcare institutions should make certain that students and
trainees are fully educated about the risks associated with testing
of themselves for, and management of patients with, bloodborne
pathogen infections (A-III). All providers who are at risk for
occupational exposure to blood should be immunized with the
hepatitis B vaccine, unless it is contraindicated (A-I). All health-
care providers should know their serological status with respect
to antibody to HBsAg, which should be measured 1–6 months
after the completion of their HBV immunization series (A-III).
Institutions should assist students and trainees who are deter-
mined to be infected with bloodborne pathogens in identifying
and selecting career choices that will be the least influenced by
their infection(s) (A-III). Healthcare institutions should maintain
the privacy and medical confidentiality of students and trainees
identified as infected with bloodborne pathogens (A-III). HBV-
infected students and trainees who are either HBeAg positive or
who have circulating HBV burdens greater than or equal to 104
GE/mL should refrain from training in or conducting procedures
listed in Category III (A-III); HCV-infected students and trainees
who have circulating viral burdens in excess of 104 GE/mL should
refrain from training in or conducting procedures listed in Cat-
egory III (B-III); HIV-infected students and trainees who have
circulating viral burdens greater than or equal to GE/mL25 # 10
should refrain from conducting procedures listed in Category III
(B-III). Students and trainees who are not receiving optimal ther-
apy for their bloodborne pathogen infection(s) should seek such
treatment (A-I).
Discussion. A special problem arises when a training insti-
tution becomes aware that a trainee is chronically infected
with a bloodborne pathogen. Each of these instances should
be handled on a case-by-case basis, in consultation with the
institution’s legal counsel, the house staff training director,
infection control professionals, the Dean of the school, and
others who are involved stakeholders. To date, these cases
have been handled unevenly across the United States, with
some institutions focusing on the disability-law aspects and
others focusing on liability.90 The law concerning these issues
is changing rapidly and is relatively untested in the higher
courts. The institution, however, does have responsibility to
make certain that the trainee is fully informed about the
risks—both to the trainee and to his or her patients—asso-
ciated with clinical practice. The institution should under-
score the importance of appropriate treatment and the im-
portance of adherance to infection control recommendations.
The institution should assist the trainee in selecting a career
path best suited to her or his specific situation and should
provide reasonable accommodation to students and trainees
who have disabling conditions. By adopting the modification
of the position initially proffered by Reitsma et al1 (ie, the 3-
tiered risk schema), SHEA advocates encouraging trainees
who are infected with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV and whose
infection(s) cannot be effectively cleared or whose infections
cannot be suppressed below the thresholds identified in Rec-
ommendations 1, 2, and 3 (above), to select career paths that
do not involve the highest-risk procedures. In instances in
which the decision is made to continue training, SHEA ad-
vocates having the student be closely supervised by an at-
tending provider who is aware of the student’s status when
the student is learning or performing Category II procedures.
7. Should providers infected with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV
be subject to specific monitoring programs, and, if so,
how and by whom and to whom should the data be
reported?
Recommendation
Providers infected with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV who perform
Category III procedures should have their circulating viral bur-
dens measured at least every 6 months by an engaged occupational
medicine practitioner and should undergo periodic evaluations
(at a minimum, twice per year) by a physician selected by the
provider who has demonstrated expertise in the management of
the provider’s infection. Results of the viral burden tests should
be reviewed by the Occupational Medicine physician, should be
reviewed with the provider’s personal physician, and should be
evaluated by the provider’s Expert Review Panel (A-III).
Discussion. Because the guidelines recommend viral burden
cutoffs for practice restrictions, SHEA believes that an on-
going monitoring program is essential. Most molecular assay
results are reproducible only within about half an order of
magnitude. A fraction of infected individuals have fluctuating
viral burdens. SHEA recommends a major role for the Oc-
cupational Medicine practitioner in supervising the moni-
toring program. This role would include, but not be limited
to, measuring the provider’s circulating viral burden at least
twice annually and providing advice to the Expert Review
Panel about the provider’s progress and ongoing clinical
status. For independent practitioners working only from an
office, these functions should be fulfilled by the city, county
or state health department (consonant with state and local
laws). Elements of follow-up are summarized in Table 5.
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table 5. Functions of the Expert Review Panel
1. Evaluation of the infected provider’s clinical status
2. Assessment of the provider’s viral burden data
3. Assessment of the provider’s experience and expertise
4. Assessment of the procedures performed by the provider and
the specific techniques used to perform these procedures
5. Determination of the extent to which the provider adheres to
accepted infection control precautions
6. Provision of recommendations about the use of specific barri-
ers, work practice controls, and infection prevention strategies
for the conduct of specific procedures and assess the provider’s
willingness to adhere to these recommendations
7. Provision of counseling to the provider about her or his ethical
obligation to report a patient exposure, should one occur, and
about the appropriate procedures to follow, should an exposure
occur
8. Develop and execute a contract between the infected provider
and the Expert Review Panel and/or institution (see Table 5)
9. In instances in which transmission is suspected, consider the
potential for narcotics diversion
10. Notify Risk Management should a breach in procedure or a
patient exposure occur
11. Notification of the appropriate licensure board for breaches of
the signed contract with the Expert Review Panel (if required
by state regulations)
note. In instances in which an infected provider is not institutionally
based, this responsibility should fall to the local or state health department
(consonant with existing state laws).
8. Prior recommendations have suggested the creation of
an Expert Review Panel for assisting institutions in
managing providers infected with bloodborne pathogens.
Is there a role for such a panel in 2009 and beyond? If so,
what is that role, and at what level should the committee
be convened (eg, at the institutional, city, or state level),
who should comprise such a committee, what should be
the committee’s charge, and how and by whom should
the committee be managed? Do committee members
accept liability for participation?
Recommendation
Healthcare providers infected with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV should
have their clinical status and laboratory data reviewed by an
Expert Review Panel (A-III). Such a panel could exist at a state,
regional, county, city, or institutional level, consonant with the
individual provider’s circumstance and with state and local laws.
The review panel should include, but not necessarily be limited
to, individuals who have expertise in the infected provider’s spe-
cialty or subspecialty, Healthcare Epidemiology, Infectious Dis-
eases or Hepatology (specifically with expertise in the bloodborne
pathogen[s] being discussed), Occupational Medicine, and/or
hospital administration; the infected provider’s physician; a public
health official (in states in which this issue is managed at the state
level); a human resources professional; and, perhaps, an individ-
ual with legal and/or ethics expertise. The review panel will advise
the healthcare provider, the Occupational Medicine physician,
and/or the patient’s primary physician about the provider’s prac-
tice and about the advisability of her or his performing Category
III procedures, as well as about the use of infection control in-
terventions (A-III). The panel will create a contract or letter de-
tailing the provider’s responsibilities and those of the panel (Fig-
ure 1). Before the provider returns to practice, this document
must be agreed to and signed by the provider and the panel chair
(A-III). The panel should reconsider the provider’s performance
in the event any of the following occurs: the provider’s viral load
increases to above the recommended level for consideration of
restrictions from performing Category III procedures; the pro-
vider develops another contagious disease (eg, tuberculosis); the
provider develops another condition that might adversely effect
patient safety (eg, HIV-associated neurological impairment or he-
patic encephalopathy); the provider fails to strictly adhere to rec-
ommended infection control practices; a patient is exposed to a
potentially contaminated body fluid of the provider; and/or if
there is evidence of provider-to-patient transmission (A-III). The
entity chartering the panel should indemnify the panel members
against any legal risks and/or costs (A-III).
Discussion. SHEA believes that the creation of an Expert
Review Panel to assist in the management of these providers
is an important aspect of a patient safety program. Such a
program could exist at a state, county, city or institutional
level. We believe that the fact that no such cases have received
publicity in the United States since the early part of this
decade is an indirect reflection of the efficacy of this approach.
The basic functions of the Expert Review Panel are described
in Table 5. The panel, at a minimum, should include rep-
resentation from Hospital Epidemiology, Infectious Diseases,
the provider’s specialty or subspecialty, Occupational Medi-
cine (ie, the individual involved in monitoring the provider),
hospital administration, and, perhaps, legal representation.
Each case will be slightly different from the next, and each
should be considered independently in context. These subtle
differences underscore the importance of the Expert Review
Panel. The panel should develop a formal letter or contract
delineating its specific recommendations regarding the pro-
vider’s performance, training in infection control, conduct of
specific procedures, follow-up, and management, among
other issues (Figure 1). Table 6 provides a list of issues for
the infection control professional and the Expert Review
Panel to consider when providing advice to infected providers
regarding the performance of various procedures. Table 7
provides detail concerning the elements of this letter or con-
tract. The requirement for a twice-annual meeting of the
panel may be met by a confidential conference call or secure
electronic communication. The Occupational Medicine phy-
sician, the infection control professional, and/or the state ep-
idemiologist can serve as gatekeepers for the twice-annual
review. So long as the contract is being fulfilled and no guide-
line violations are identified, additional face-to-face meetings
figure 1. Sample contract letter between an Expert Review Panel and a healthcare provider infected with a bloodborne pathogen. The
letter delineates the specific recommendations of the panel and the responsibilities of the panel and of the infected provider. Table 7 provides
more detail on the elements of such a letter or contract.
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table 6. Issues for the Hospital Epidemiologist and the Expert Review Panel to Consider When Pro-
viding Advice to Infected Healthcare Providers Regarding the Performance of Various Procedures
1. The precise procedures for which permission is sought, the historical risks for provider-to-patient
bloodborne pathogen transmission associated with these procedures, the provider’s experience with
such procedures, and the likelihood of patient exposure to provider blood during these procedures
2. Gather evidence of the infected provider’s skills, practices, and adherence to the institutional infec-
tion control plan (particularly with respect to standard precautions)
3. Investigate and discuss with the provider the availability of safer devices that will reduce the risk for
patient exposures (eg, spring-loaded retractable needles, guards that shield dangerous tips, and
blunted surgical needles)
4. Investigate and discuss the availability of barriers that will reduce the risks for exposures (eg, rein-
forced gloves,91,92 double gloves, gloves constructed of monofilament polymers or other materials re-
sistant to tears, glove-liners, and other devices or materials to protect the provider’s hands89,91,93-96)
5. Discuss work process controls, such as the “hands free” technique in the operating room142
6. Emphasize the need and ethical obligation to notify the hospital epidemiologist, immediate supervi-
sor, or other individual, as detailed (or identified) in the contract, should a breach and/or patient
exposure occur
7. Emphasize a detailed description of the process to be used in the event of breach of infection con-
trol procedures or a patient exposure
of the Expert Review Panel may not be needed. In instances
in which guideline violations are identified or in instances in
which the provider’s clinical status has changed significantly,
the entire review panel should meet to consider the new
information. The committee emphasizes that the Expert Re-
view Panel should not advise the practitioner about his or
her health and treatment options; this responsibility falls to
the provider’s personal physician.
i i . disclosure issues
9. Are there any medical settings in which a healthcare
provider infected with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV should be
routinely required to notify patients of his or her
bloodborne pathogen status; and, if so, what are the
specific types of circumstances requiring notification?
Recommendation
Providers infected with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV who are adhering
to the guidelines above should not be required to disclose their
infection status to any patient (unless the provider has been the
source for an exposure for a patient, as discussed in Recommen-
dation 11A, below) (A-III).
Discussion. Societal views of patients’ rights are strong, and
most patients feel that they have a right to know if their
physician or other healthcare provider is infected with a po-
tentially transmissible bloodborne pathogen (irrespective of
the magnitude of risk).118,148,149 A national survey conducted
in 2004 demonstrates little change in public views of this
issue.118 Case law has generally concluded that informed con-
sent includes disclosure of risks that may be perceived by
patients as being important even if, by rational consideration,
they are negligible. These positions aside, in both previous
versions of this guideline, we concluded that a requirement
for such disclosure would very likely require a provider to
abandon or substantially modify his or her practice—an un-
warranted outcome in light of our current understanding of
the risks for provider-to-patient transmission of these blood-
borne pathogens. The existing 1991 US Public Health Service
guidelines105 require that patients who are to have “exposure-
prone invasive procedures” performed by HIV-positive or
HBeAg-positive, HBV-infected practitioners be notified of the
practitioner’s infection status prior to the procedure. On the
basis of the substantial changes in the risk profile since the
previous version of this guideline was published (eg, new
safety devices, new infection control strategies, better tech-
niques for monitoring diseases, effective postexposure man-
agement, and effective therapy), SHEA feels even more
strongly that such a position is unwarranted. If practitioners
adhere to the components of this guideline with respect to
modifying their practices when an increased level of risk is
present, in the absence of an adverse patient exposure to
blood or blood-containing body fluids (discussed in Rec-
ommendation 11, below), the risk for provider-to-patient
transmission is so small that it cannot be accurately mea-
sured. SHEA’s position on these issues remains essentially
unchanged. An earlier iteration of the American Hospital
Association Patients’ Bill of Rights argues for disclosure of
relevant information to patients,150,151although this “Bill of
Rights” has subsequently been replaced by a plain-language
document that does not directly address this issue. The Amer-
ican Medical Association Council on Judicial Affairs also in-
cludes a general statement in favor of patient disclosure.152
10. Are there circumstances for which an infected
healthcare provider should be required to obtain informed
consent that includes disclosure of the provider’s
serostatus from a patient prior to a procedure?
Recommendation
Providers infected with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV who are adhering
to the guidelines above should be required to obtain informed
consent for a procedure but should not be required to disclose
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table 7. Elements of the Contract between an Infected Healthcare Provider and the Expert Review Panel
Responsibilities of the healthcare provider
1. Agrees to twice yearly follow-up by Occupational Medicine, including measurement of viral burden using tests
specified by the panel
2. Agrees to twice yearly evaluations by a private physician who has expertise in the provider’s specific blood-
borne pathogen infection and agrees to have this physician discuss the results of these evaluations with the
provider’s Expert Review Panel
3. Agrees to formal training in infection control via a course identified by the infection control expert, or, alter-
natively agrees to counseling by the infection control professional concerning the use of appropriate infection
control procedures, safety devices and work practice controls
4. Agrees to follow the recommended procedures and practices identified in the previous item (responsibility 3)
5. Agrees to notify the occupational medicine or the public health authority participating in the panel regarding
any change in provider status that may increase risk to the patient (eg, new neurological findings, development
of another contagious disease [eg, tuberculosis])
6. Acknowledges the ethical obligation to do so, and agrees to report instances immediately in which a patient
exposure may have occurred to the hospital epidemiologist or to appropriate institutional/public health author-
ities identified in the contract, so that the potentially exposed patient may receive appropriate postexposure
management and counseling
7. If receiving treatment, agrees to continue treatment as prescribed and agrees to notify occupational medicine if
the treatment regimen is modified for any reason
8. Agrees to re-evaluation by expert panel and revision of contract should clinical status or viral burden change
Responsibilities of the institution and/or public health authorities
1. Agrees to convene Expert Review Panel at least twice annually (see text) to assess provider’s clinical and viro-
logic status as well as the provider’s ongoing performance and her or his ability to continue to perform re-
quested procedures
2. Agrees to maintain provider’s medical privacy and confidentiality
3. Agrees to develop and follow institutional or provider-based follow-up procedure for potential patient expo-
sure that makes every effort to ensure practitioner confidentiality
4. Panel participants should have no liability
5. Develops process for notifying hospital Risk Management
note. Some aspects of this contract may be mandated by state laws, so the contract should carefully consider the legal requirements
for the state in which the contract is being issued. A sample contract letter is shown in Figure 1.
their serostatus as part of the process of informed consent from
patients on whom they are about to perform a procedure (A-III).
Discussion. If a practitioner adheres to the guidelines out-
lined in detail above, SHEA concludes that the risk for trans-
mission would be so small that informed consent about the
risk of transmission would not be required. In special cir-
cumstances associated with a known or anticipated increased
level of risk (eg, a provider who has previously transmitted
infection to a patient or a provider who has a viral burden
in excess of those listed in these guidelines is performing a
Category III procedure), obtaining informed consent is ra-
tional, prudent, and advised.
i i i . exposure management
11. How should a provider-to-patient blood exposure or
other hazardous body fluid exposure to HBV, HCV, and/
or HCV be managed?
11A. Should a provider who is the source of a patient
exposure be required to undergo testing for bloodborne
pathogen infection?
Recommendation
A provider who is aware that he or she is the source of a significant
patient exposure to his or her blood or hazardous body fluid
should undergo testing for infection with bloodborne pathogens,
even if not known to be infected with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV
(A-III). Healthcare institutions should develop specific policies to
deal with such exposures and should establish sanctions for pro-
viders who refuse testing for bloodborne pathogens in these cir-
cumstances (A-III). Such policies should be formally drawn and
approved by institutional attorneys and governing boards (A-III).
Recommendation
In the event of possible or documented patient exposure to blood
or potentially hazardous body fluids from an infected provider,
the involved provider is ethically obligated to notify immediately
either the Occupational Medicine physician who is conducting
follow-up for the provider or the chair of the provider’s Expert
Review Panel (A-III). Whoever is notified should immediately
engage the infection control team, the hospital administration,
and institutional risk management team to ensure there is ap-
propriate follow-up and medical management for the potentially
exposed patient (A-III). In the event of possible or documented
patient exposure to blood or potentially hazardous body fluids
from an infected provider who is not institutionally based, the
provider is ethically bound to contact the official in the public
health establishment who is providing Expert Review Panel over-
sight (A-III). This individual, in turn, should immediately ensure
that there is appropriate follow-up and medical management for
the potentially exposed patient (A-III).
Discussion. State laws and State policies and procedures
vary substantially with respect to testing for bloodborne path-
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ogens. Healthcare institutions electing to develop policies that
compel testing of the source individual should make certain
that such polices are legal in their jurisdictions and should
apply such policies only to exposures for which scientific
precedent establishes that HBV, HCV, or HIV transmission
could occur.
11B. Should an inadvertently exposed patient be notified
of the exposure?
Recommendation
A patient who has been exposed (ie, by way of percutaneous,
mucous membrane, or nonintact-skin exposure) to the blood or
potentially contaminated body fluid of any provider should be
notified of the exposure promptly and given clear options for
follow-up testing and management (A-III). An exposed patient
(1) should be notified about the exposure promptly; (2) should
subsequently be notified of the outcome of the source provider’s
HBV, HCV, and HIV test results; (3) should receive expert coun-
seling regarding the implications of the event; and (4) should be
offered effective postexposure treatment appropriate for the ex-
posure in instances in which an exposure to a bloodborne path-
ogen is documented (consistent with current CDC guide-
lines153,154) (A-III). Institutions should establish policies requiring
self-reporting to the infection control program or occupational
health program and to the exposed patient’s primary physician
of provider-to-patient blood or hazardous body fluid exposure
(A-III). The exposed patient should not be notified of the source
provider’s name or of the exact circumstances of the exposure
but should be provided with enough information to understand
the implications of the exposure fully (A-III).
Discussion. For a variety of reasons, in instances in which
a provider-to-patient blood exposure occurs, the patient has
a right to know that the exposure has occurred, irrespective
of whether the provider is known to be infected with a blood-
borne pathogen. The patient must be notified about the ex-
posure and presented with options for postexposure treat-
ment (as appropriate), as well as appropriate follow-up.153,154
In addition, the patient must receive counseling about the
risk for transmission and the strategies that are effective in
preventing subsequent transmission of the bloodborne path-
ogen to which the patient was exposed. Since any exposure
to blood may place patients at risk for acquiring a bloodborne
infection, patients should always be notified of such occur-
rences. The identity of the source (ie, the infected provider)
should not be disclosed. Needlestick transmissions (as well
as mucous membrane and nonintact-skin transmissions) of
HBV, HCV, and HIV infection have all been amply docu-
mented. Since negative serologic test results do not completely
eliminate the possibility of transmission of bloodborne path-
ogens, any blood exposure creates a requirement for notifi-
cation of the exposed patient. Notification also allows the
exposed patient to have the option of receiving recommended
postexposure management (eg, appropriate chemoprophy-
laxis or immunoprophylaxis). Institutions should designate
a responsible person for informing an exposed patient and
ensuring patient follow-up. Ultimate responsibility for fol-
low-up should be assigned to the patient’s physician, even if
the physician is the source of the exposure. The physician
providing the follow-up should receive expert guidance from
a member of the Infection Control and/or Occupational
Health staff. SHEA would not recommend that the source of
the exposure be involved in counseling, informed consent,
or test explanation, in light of the potential for conflict of
interest. The hospital epidemiologist, infection control prac-
titioner, or other staff knowledgeable both about the risks
and routes of transmission of bloodborne pathogens, as well
as the counseling of individuals exposed to bloodborne path-
ogens, should be available for support and consultation.
11C. Should an inadvertently exposed patient be required
to undergo baseline serologic testing?
Recommendation
The exposed patient and his or her physician should be asked
for consent to perform baseline testing for bloodborne infections
(when consonant with state and/or local laws) (A-III). If consent
is obtained, the patient’s serum should be tested for evidence of
HBV, HCV, and HIV infection (A-III). If the patient refuses test-
ing, the institution should seek the permission of the patient or
the patient’s representative to store available baseline serum from
the patient (A-III). If neither testing nor storage can be accom-
plished, the patient or the patient’s proxy should be asked to sign
a formal declination emphasizing that these services were offered
and declined (A-III).
Discussion. Although the exposed patient cannot be com-
pelled to have and may clearly choose not to have such testing
performed, such testing would help establish the basis (and
some of the best evidence) for a claim against the institution
and/or the practitioner. Exposed patients should be made
aware of the potential value and detriment of negative and
positive test results. For patients who refuse testing (and con-
sonant with state and local laws regarding testing), institu-
tions should attempt to obtain informed consent from the
patient to allow the institution to preserve a carefully labeled
and dated baseline serum sample from the exposed patient.
Although such samples cannot be tested against the patient’s
will, these samples ultimately represent important evidence
in such a case. Patients refusing to consent to serum storage
should be asked to sign a form noting their declination for
both serologic testing and serum storage.
11D. How (and by whom) should an inadvertently
exposed patient be followed and, if appropriate, treated?
Recommendation
Exposed patients should be counseled regarding the risks for in-
fection and the symptoms of acute HBV, HCV, and HIV infection
(A-III), should be offered postexposure chemoprophylaxis and/
or immunoprophylaxis as is characterized in current CDC guide-
lines for an exposed healthcare worker153,154 (A-II), and should be
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followed in a manner analogous to the existing CDC guidelines
for providers who sustain occupational exposures to HIV or other
bloodborne pathogens.153,154 Institutions and/or providers in-
volved in such exposures should provide testing at no cost to the
patient and should provide the details of appropriate follow-up
to the patient and her or his physician (A-I).
iv. testing issues
12. Should any, or perhaps all, providers be routinely
tested for HIV infection?
Recommendation
Mandatory HBV, HCV, or HIV screening of healthcare providers
is not recommended (A-III). A provider who conducts Category
III procedures is ethically obligated to know his or her infection
status with respect to HBV, HCV, and HIV (A-III). Institutions
should provide voluntary confidential testing for their employees
(A-III). A provider who knows that he or she is the source of a
patient exposure (ie, as defined by the CDC—a percutaneous,
mucous membrane or nonintact-skin exposure) to his or her
blood or hazardous blood or body fluid should report the ex-
posure and should undergo testing for infection with bloodborne
pathogens (A-III).
v. look-back studies
13. If an infected provider is identified, under what
circumstances should a look-back study be conducted?
Recommendation
Look-back studies should be conducted only on a case-by-case
basis in instances in which compelling evidence for increased risk
for provider-to-patient transmission is identified (A-III). A de-
cision to initiate a look-back study should be made in collabo-
ration with the infected provider’s Expert Review Panel, insti-
tutional leadership, and appropriate local and/or state public
health authorities (A-III).
Discussion. Although look-back studies may occasionally
provide useful information, most look-back studies have
yielded no useful information, and all such investigations are
extremely labor-intense and resource-intense.48,57 SHEA rec-
ommends that such studies be conducted only when factors
are identified that suggest an increased risk for provider-to-
patient transmission of one of these bloodborne pathogens.
A variety of circumstances may prompt initiation of a look-
back study. These include (1) if an infected healthcare worker
is identified during the investigation of a possible instance of
healthcare-associated transmission of one of these viruses, (2)
if provider-to-patient transmission infection is documented
or presumed, (3) if there is disclosure of a bloodborne path-
ogen infection associated with a viral burden higher than the
thresholds defined in Recommendations 1, 2, and 3 (above),
by a healthcare worker who has been conducting Category
III procedures, or (4) if an ongoing screening program iden-
tifies an infected healthcare worker who has been conducting
Category III procedures and who has a viral burden in excess
of the thresholds noted in Recommendations 1, 2, and 3
(above). The goals for such an investigation include (1) the
provision of information to patients regarding the nature and
magnitude of risks to which they may have been exposed,
(2) the identification of patients who may have become in-
fected with one or more of these bloodborne pathogens as a
result of healthcare interventions and who may benefit from
treatment, (3) the prevention of additional instances of trans-
mission, (4) the management of institutional risks, and (5)
the reassurance of the public.
The decision about whether to conduct a look-back study
should be made on a case-by-case basis. Factors that would
suggest an increased risk for provider-to-patient transmission
that would prompt such a study include (1) identification of
an infected patient in the practice of an infected provider
(and the demonstration of that the patient’s and the pro-
vider’s viral isolates are related), (2) the healthcare provider’s
clinical specialty and the types of procedures performed are
among those associated with increased risk for transmission,
(3) concern that a given provider fails to follow recommended
infection control procedures, (4) evidence of substandard
clinical practice (eg, high postoperative infection rates or fre-
quent occupational exposures), and (5) comorbid medical
diagnoses in the infected provider that might elevate risk (eg,
conditions resulting in, for example, nonintact skin or early
dementia).
The identification of a documented instance of provider-
to-patient transmission of one of these 3 bloodborne path-
ogens should invariably result in a thorough look-back ex-
ercise. In the absence of a documented instance of provider-
to-patient transmission, the Expert Review Panel should eval-
uate the risk for transmission on a case-by-case basis. If a
look-back study is implemented, every effort should be made
to preserve the privacy and medical confidentiality of the
infected provider.
In instances in which the infected provider is institutionally
based, the provider’s institution should be responsible for the
notification program, with appropriate collaboration with the
local and state public health authorities. In instances in which
the provider is not institutionally based, local or state public
health authorities should decide about the need for such a
study. If the decision is made to initiate such a study, the
decision should be made, and the study conducted, by the
appropriate public health authorities.
summary
SHEA favors a comprehensive approach to managing health-
care providers who have been identified as being infected
with HBV, HCV, and/or HIV in the broader context of all
institutional health and credentialing programs. Such an ap-
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proach allows the assessment of the provider-to-patient trans-
mission risks in appropriate perspective. Thus, reasons for
broadly restricting practice should be consonant with existing
impaired-provider and disability guidelines, and should be
based on the following criteria: (1) the provider has a viral
burden above the recommended threshold for the relevant
virus, (2) the provider has a medical condition or conditions
resulting in the provider’s inability to perform assigned tasks,
(3) the provider has documented untoward events (ie, the
provider is known to have transmitted HBV, HCV, or HIV),
(4) the provider refuses or is unable to follow recommended
guidelines to prevent transmission of infectious diseases, and/
or (5) the provider is unable to perform regular duties, as-
suming that “reasonable accommodation” has been offered
for the disability.
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